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FUTURE FINANCIAL  and  economic  historians  will  mark  1989  as a watershed 
year for the American  financial  system. This is the year policymakers 
forced themselves to come to terms with their failure to supervise 
adequately  the nation's  depository  institutions  and  to adopt  sound  capital 
regulation  to attempt  to offset properly  the "moral  hazard"  due  to federal 
deposit insurance. In early 1989, the new administration  proposed a 
comprehensive plan for ridding the financial system of at least 700 
insolvent thrift  institutions  over the next decade and for reforming  the 
regulatory  system that was supposed  to have prevented  their collapse. 
Over the next few months Congress  debated  and changed  the adminis- 
tration's  proposal. 
Although  it is likely that  some parts  of the final  legislation  will clearly 
move in the right  direction,  serious  problems  should  remain.  In our  view 
the projections  by the administration  on which the plan  is based under- 
state the cost and budgetary  effect of addressing  what has come to be 
called the  "thrift crisis."  For its part, Congress may weaken the 
administration's  proposed  capital  standards  and  thus  frustrate  efforts  to 
restore proper incentives for thrifts to avoid excessive  risk-taking. 
Meanwhile, the widespread attention given by policymakers  and the 
media  to the problems  in the thrift  industry  has unfortunately  obscured 
similar  significant  problems  among  commercial  banks. 
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In this paper, we examine the problem of both the banks and the 
thrifts. We then analyze the key components of the thrift legislation, 
giving special emphasis to its estimated costs and budget impact and 
examining  the assumptions on which these estimates are based. We 
conclude  with some general  thoughts  on the fundamental  reforms  of the 
deposit insurance and regulatory  systems needed to prevent another 
such crisis either  among  banks  or among  thrifts. 
The Thrift Crisis: How Bad? 
Not two years ago, this audience heard two of the authors of this 
paper  describe the deteriorating  conditions  of the nation's thrift  indus- 
try.' Between 1980  and 1986, nearly 600 of the nation's roughly  4,000 
thrift  institutions  had failed. At the end of 1986,  468 thrifts  holding  $126 
billion in assets were insolvent under generally accepted accounting 
principles  (GAAP)  but  were still  operating  because  the  industry's  insurer, 
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation  (FSLIC) had 
insufficient funds to close them. Another 515 institutions with $255 
billion  in assets were weakly  capitalized,  with  capital-to-asset  ratios  less 
than  3 percent. 
In sum, fully one-third  of the nation's thrifts then still in business, 
with roughly  the same share  of the industry's  assets, were insolvent or 
in very weak condition. Allowing these institutions  to remain  open, it 
was argued,  would only make matters  worse. With access to federally 
insured deposits, these insolvent or weakly capitalized depositories 
clearly had incentives to "bet the bank" every day. Losses were borne 
exclusively, or nearly  so, by the deposit  insurer.  But  extraordinary  gains 
could bring  a dead institution  back to life. 
The solutions were straightforward.  Insolvent institutions should 
have been expeditiously  liquidated  or merged  with healthier  partners. 
At the resolution  cost-to-asset ratio prevailing  in 1986,  applying  such a 
policy to the insolvent institutions  open that year would have cost an 
estimated  $22 billion. The rest of the industry,  meanwhile,  should  have 
been subjected  to stiff capital  regulation,  comparable  to the 6 percent  of 
assets required  for banks. Solvent, but weak, institutions  that  could not 
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meet that standard  should not have been allowed to grow and thus 
continue  gambling  at the insurer's  expense. 
All this sounds so reasonable  now that it is a wonder that it was not 
done. But for a variety of political reasons it was not. Unsurprisingly, 
the thrift  industry  since has deteriorated  even further,  and the cost of 
restoring  it to health  has soared. 
Table 1 provides some key measures  of the thrift  industry's  financial 
condition  as of December 1988.  Of the nation's 2,949 operating  thrifts, 
364  were insolvent, reporting  an average  ratio  of GAAP  capital  to assets 
of -  11.6  percent. In 1988  alone, this group  of thrifts  lost $14.8  billion  on 
an asset base of $113.5  billion.  This loss figure  understates  the losses by 
all insolvent  thrifts  in 1988  since the insolvent  category  shown in table 1 
does not include  the 205  thrifts  removed  from  the system by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank  Board  in 1988.  According  to the Bank  Board, FSLIC 
assistance of $38.6 billion  in present  value was provided  to these thrifts 
and  to 17  additional  failed  institutions  that  the FSLIC allowed  to remain 
open. 
Table 1  also shows the weak financial  condition  of over 1,200  GAAP- 
solvent thrifts,  or those with GAAP capital  between 0 and 6 percent. In 
fact, a substantial  portion  of the capital  of these institutions  consists of 
goodwill, primarily  the premium  over book value paid  by these institu- 
tions to acquire  assets or other institutions.  In principle,  goodwill may 
also represent  the "going concern" or "franchise  value" of an institu- 
tion. However, to an insurer,  goodwill  for an otherwise  weakly capital- 
ized institution  is likely to be illusory since goodwill is intangible  and 
cannot be sold if the institution  must one day be liquidated.  Moreover, 
given the recent lifting of restrictions  against  branching  and interstate 
expansion  in many  states, coupled  with the relatively  free entry  into the 
depository  business, a bank  or thrift  charter  by itself today  has relatively 
little  franchise  value. In  recognition  of these considerations,  the recently 
amended  capital  standards  for banks  do not count  goodwill  in measuring 
capital. 
Applying  the same standards  to the thrifts  would mean that the 390 
institutions  with GAAP capital-to-asset  ratios between 0 and 3 percent 
at the end of 1988 actually had "tangible" capital averaging  only 0.2 
percent of their $314.8 billion in assets. Another 969 institutions  with 
GAAP capital-to-asset ratios between 3 and 6 percent had tangible 
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Table 1.  Financial Condition of Thrift Institutions Grouped by GAAP Capital Ratios, 
December 1988 
Billions  of dollars except  as noted 
GAAP  capital as a percent of assets 
Less  More 
Item  than 0  0-3  3-6  than 6  Total 
Number  of institutions  364  390  969  1,226  2,949 
Net  income,  calendar  -  14.8  -  1.0  1.7  2.0  -  12.1 
year 1988 
Percent  of institutions  12  56  74  87  70 
profitable 
Total assets  113.5  314.8  639.4  283.8  1,351.5 
GAAP  capital  -  13.2  5.3  28.9  25.2  46.2 
Goodwill  2.7  4.8  11.1  4.7  23.2 
Tangible  capital  -  15.9  0.5  17.8  20.5  23.0 
GAAP capital-to-asset  -  11.6  1.7  4.5  8.9  3.4 
ratio (percent) 
Tangible  capital-to-  -  14.0  0.2  2.8  7.2  1.7 
asset ratio (percent) 
Source:  Federal Home  Loan Bank Board. 
sum, nearly 80 percent of the assets held by the nation's thrifts  at year 
end 1988  ($1.07  trillion  out of a total $1.35 trillion)  were being managed 
by institutions  with less than  3 percent  tangible  capital,  or a capital  level 
less than  half  the minimum  6 percent  standard  for banks. 
There  is little dispute  that  the situation  has deteriorated  rapidly.  Most 
of the disagreement  among analysts is over the cost of resolving the 
worsening problem. In principle, the cost of removing all insolvent 
institutions  from the financial  system can be measured  by aggregating 
their  negative  net worth, measured  as the difference  between the market 
value of assets and liabilities. In practice, however, market  values for 
these institutions  cannot be estimated  precisely without having  access 
to detailed  financial  information  on each. Even then, the analyst must 
make  educated  guesses about  the market  values  of many  individual  loans 
and properties  (often acquired  through  foreclosure)  for which no well- 
developed secondary  market  exists. 
We use a simpler  cost estimation  approach  here, multiplying  assumed 
"loss ratios" by the vtiumes of assets held by failed or failing  thrifts  in 
different  GAAP  capital-to-asset  categories. The negative  GAAP  capital 
ratios themselves do not provide reliable indicators of the negative 
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Cases  Cases  Cases  unresolved 
resolved  resolved  resolved  as of 
Item  in 1986  in 1987  in 1988  12131188 
Number of thrifts  47  47  205  351 
Total assets (billions  12.5  10.5  100.6  107.0 
of dollars) 
GAAP capital-to-asset  -6.4  -19.0  -9.4  -  10.8 
ratio (percent) 
Tangible capital-to-  -8.8  - 21.9  -  12.6  -  13.6 
asset ratio (percent) 
Resolution cost, 
present value 
Billions of dollars  3.1  3.7  31.2  n.a. 
Percent of assets  24.8  35.2  31.0  n.a. 
Source:  Congressional  Budget  Office  (1989b). 
n.a. Not available. 
down many assets to reflect market  conditions. Table 2 demonstrates 
how substantial  these market  value adjustments  can be. Between 1986 
and 1988, the estimated present value resolution  cost for failed thrifts 
varied  between 25 percent  and 35 percent  of their  assets, well above (in 
absolute terms) their negative 6 percent to 19 percent average GAAP 
capital-to-asset  ratios. 
Table 3 indicates  that the FSLIC's loss experience also has been far 
worse with the relatively  few thrifts it has liquidated  (where the costs 
are known  with certainty)  than  with those whose merger  it has assisted 
(where  the costs must  be estimated).  The FSLIC has strongly  preferred 
mergers  to liquidations  in recent years as a way of conserving  the scarce 
cash in the thrift  insurance  fund;  whereas liquidations  require  up-front 
outlays to pay off depositors  (and  no cash receipts  until  the thrift  assets 
are sold), mergers  can be arranged  with various long-term  guarantees 
and  tax benefits  that  require  little or no immediate  cash payments  by the 
FSLIC.2 It is  nevertheless significant that the loss  ratios for both 
2. Although  the FSLIC's  merger  agreements  are  not disclosed  to the public,  the rough 
outlines of recent typical thrift deals are well known. In return  for some new capital 
contributed  by the purchaser,  the FSLIC agrees to guarantee  some portion  of the failed 
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Table 3.  Resolution Costs for Failed Thrifts, Mergers, and Liquidations,  1986-88 
Merger s  Liqlidations 
Item  1986  1987  1988  1986  1987  1988 
Number of thrifts  26  30  179  21  17  26 
Total assets  (billions of  6.4  7.6  97.7  5.9  2.9  3.0 
dollars) 
Total resolution  cost, 
present value 
Billions  of dollars  0.5  1.4  28.3  2.5  2.3  2.8 
Percent of assets  7.8  18.4  29.0  42.4  79.3  93.3 
Source:  Congressional  Budget Office (1989b). 
liquidations  and mergers  rose at a rapid  rate between 1986 and 1988. 
Indeed, the only reason the FSLIC was able to lower its aggregate  loss 
ratio between 1987  and 1988  (table 2) was by increasing  the share of its 
thrift  cases resolved by merger  rather  than  by liquidation. 
Given  the substantial  uncertainties  about  the market  value  of all  assets 
held by insolvent  thrifts,  we believe it most useful  to present  and  discuss 
the current thrift problem in terms of a range rather than as a point 
estimate. As shown in table  4, we divide  the universe  of cases into three 
categories  and  estimate  costs under  three sets of assumptions  for each. 
We include the first category of cases, or the 222 thrifts merged, 
liquidated,  or otherwise assisted in 1988, in the cost estimates for the 
current  problem  because most of the costs incurred  in that year arise 
from income and capital  guarantees  extended by FSLIC to purchasers 
of failed  thrifts  for as long as 10  years in the future.  As noted  earlier,  the 
FSLIC estimates that the present value of these guarantees,  combined 
with promissory  notes and cash outlays for mergers  and liquidations  in 
1988, totals $38.6 billion. We assume this projection  for both our low 
and  medium  scenarios.  However, given  uncertainty  about  future  interest 
rate movements and economic developments  in the Southwest, where 
thrift  failures  have been concentrated,  we believe it prudent  to allow for 
on those assets (a premium  over the thrift's  cost of funds  that  declines  over time). These 
guarantees  typically  extend  as long  as 10  years;  and  the capital  loss guarantee  requires  the 
thrift  to share  any  gains  on asset sales with  the FSLIC.  The FSLIC  also often  makes  some 
modest contribution  to the failed thrift  in the form of a promissory  note. Finally, until 
January 1, 1989, purchasers  of failed thrifts were allowed to offset the thrifts' prior 
accumulated  losses against  the purchasers'  other current  income. By typically  requiring 
the purchasers  to contribute  this tax benefit  to the failed thrift,  the FSLIC was in effect 
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Table 4.  Estimated Present Value Cost of Resolving the Thrift Problem 
Billions  of dollars 
Item  Low  Medium  High 
FSLIC actions taken in 1988a  38.6  38.6  46.3 
Remaining  GAAP insolvents  32.1  37.5  42.8 
as of 12/31/88b 
GAAP solvent thrifts  with  15.8  31.5  47.3 
less than 3 percent  capital- 
to-asset ratiosc 
Total  86.5  107.6  136.4 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  Applies  to 222 thrifts. Low  and medium estimates  are those  of FSLIC.  High estimate  adds 20 percent. 
b.  Applies  to 351 thrifts with $107 billion in assets.  Low  estimate  of loss  ratio is 30 percent;  medium estimate  is 
35 percent; high estimate  is 40 percent. 
c.  Applies  to 390 thrifts with $315 billion in assets.  Low  estimate  of loss  ratio is 5 percent; medium estimate  is  10 
percent; high estimate  is  15 percent. 
a high case 20 percent above the FSLIC's estimate, or a present value 
of $46.3  billion. 
The second category of cases covers the 351 GAAP-insolvent  insti- 
tutions that the Treasury  Department  reports  were operating  as of the 
end of 1988.3  Our  low scenario  assumes that  the loss ratio  for this group 
will average 30 percent, or just barely below the 1988  experience. The 
35 percent  loss ratio in the middle  scenario  equals the 1987  experience. 
It is also about 20 percentage  points higher  (in absolute  terms)  than the 
year end 1988  (negative)  tangible  capital-to-asset  ratio  for these institu- 
tions; this is roughly the same margin  by which the 1988 loss ratio 
exceeded the tangible  capital  position for thrifts  merged  and liquidated 
in that  year (see table 3). The 40 percent  loss ratio  for the high scenario, 
somewhat arbitrarily,  adds another  5 percentage  points to the middle 
scenario. 
Finally,  we assume that  many, if not most, of the 390 GAAP-solvent 
thrifts  with capital  ratios below 3 percent at year end 1988  are actually 
insolvent on a market value basis.  We believe this assumption is 
reasonable  since the average  tangible  capital  ratio  for the institutions  in 
this group was only 0.2 percent in December 1988 (table 1). In addi- 
tion, as  we  discuss below,  the administration's  thrift rescue plan 
3. The Treasury  Department's  figures  for GAAP-insolvent  institutions  differ  slightly 
from  those reported  by the Federal  Home Loan Bank  Board  (shown  in table 1). We have 
been unable  to determine  the reason for the difference,  but suspect that differences  in 
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provides for resolution of 350 thrifts in the 0-3 percent GAAP capital 
category over the next 10 years. Given the severe nature  of the moral 
hazard  problem  for market value insolvent institutions, we believe it 
prudent  to include an estimate for the immediate  present value cost of 
closing these institutions  as well. Our  low, middle, and high  loss ratios 
for  all  the  weakly  GAAP-capitalized  institutions  are  5, 10,  and  15  percent, 
respectively. The 15  percent  ratio  in the high  scenario  for institutions  in 
this group  is half the loss ratio for the low scenario  for current  GAAP- 
insolvent  thrifts. 
In combination,  our scenarios produce  present value cost estimates 
ranging  between  $86.5  billion  and  $136.4  billion.  If the FSLIC's  outstand- 
ing obligations  for pre-1988  case resolutions  are counted, as the admin- 
istration  does in its plan, the total cost range  for the cleanup  rises by $14 
billion,  or to a range  of $100-$150  billion. 
Problem Banks: An Untold Story 
On the surface, one could easily conclude that the U.S.  banking 
industry  is quite healthy. For 1988  the industry  reported  record  profits 
of $25.3 billion, representing  a return on equity of 13.6 percent, the 
highest since the 14.1 percent recorded in 1979. Simultaneously,  the 
Federal Deposit Insurance  Corporation  reported  that after reaching  a 
post-Depression  high  of 201 in 1988,  bank  closures have peaked  and the 
worst of the insurer's  problems  are now behind  it. 
These reports  are highly misleading,  however, and obscure a major 
continuing  threat  of losses to the deposit insurance  system and  conceiv- 
ably a large contingent  taxpayer  liability. Given the large number  and 
asset size of weak banks, the extent to which GAAP accounting  tech- 
niques hide market value losses,  and the potential for rapid asset 
deterioration,  it is possible  that  losses in  the  commercial  banking  industry 
could  eclipse those of the thrift  industry,  especially  if the  economy  enters 
a recession before  the weak capitalization  of many  banks  is corrected. 
Like our  discussion  of thrifts,  our  analysis  of the commercial  banking 
industry begins with a recognition of  the importance of capital in 
minimizing  the exposure  of the insurance  agency  to risk  taking.  Although 
the reported  level of shareholders'  equity as a percentage  of assets for 
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in 1980 to 6.3 percent in 1988-it  remains substantially  below the 10 
percent-plus  range  that prevailed  immediately  following  the creation  of 
federal  deposit insurance.4  More important,  the reported  industrywide 
level masks a growing number  of insolvent and weak banks that are 
revealed when the coverages are broken down and more realistic 
computations  are made  about  what should  be included  in the capital-to- 
asset ratio. 
Table 5 shows the number of banks with assets greater than $50 
million, as well as their cumulative  assets held, by categories of risk- 
adjusted  capital-to-asset  ratios, from December 1986  through  the third 
quarter  of 1988.  The risk  adjustments  generally  follow the procedures  of 
the new bank capital standards  adopted in the United States, Europe, 
and Japan  pursuant  to the agreement  reached by the Basle Committee 
on Banking  Regulations  and  Supervisory  Practices.  These  new standards 
calculate  required  bank  capital  ratios  based  on risk-adjusted  asset levels, 
with  assets of different  types of risk  assigned  different  weights.5  By 1992 
banks must have primary  ("Tier I") capital or shareholder's  equity 
(common  and preferred  stock and retained  earnings)  equal to 4 percent 
oftheirrisk-adjusted  assets;  and  secondary  ("TierII")  capital,  consisting 
of primary  capital plus subordinated  debt and loan reserves and other 
minor  items, equal  to 8 percent  of risk-adjusted  assets. We deviate  from 
the risk-adjusted  bank standards,  however, in two key respects: our 
capital figures  exclude loan and lease loss reserves (which provide no 
protection  to the insurer  once bad debts are properly  written off) but 
include subordinated  debt (which cannot be withdrawn  suddenly and 
thus is like capital).6 
Notwithstanding  the closure of approximately  400 banks  in 1987  and 
1988, 28 large banks with $22.5 billion in assets were still open and 
insolvent  in September  1988.  Another  48 institutions  holding  $43  billion 
in assets had  capital  ratios  below 3 percent.  Given  the tendency  of GAAP 
accounting methods to hide losses,  the situation depicted in table 5 
4.  Spellman  (1982). 
5.  For example,  at one extreme,  cash and  Treasury  securities  carry  no risk  weight;  at 
the other  extreme,  ordinary  commercial  and  consumer  loans  carry  a 100  percent  risk;  and 
other  types of assets, including  sovereign  debt of certain  countries  and mortgages,  carry 
weights  between  these extremes. 
6.  Our  exclusion of loan loss reserves is consistent with the recent proposal  by the 
Comptroller  of the Currency  to close national  banks  when equity  capital,  excluding  loan 
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probably  understates  the degree of insolvency and undercapitalization 
in the banking  industry. 
Indeed,  sobered  by the current  thrift  industry  crisis, many  economists 
consider  a depository  weakly capitalized  with market  value capital  be- 
low 6 percent. A risk-adjusted  capital measure, excluding loan loss 
reserves, provides a rough  approximation  to this capital  level. Table 5 
indicates that by this standard  much of the U.S. banking  system is on 
weak  footing:  an additional  150  banks  holding  assets totaling  $926  billion 
as of September  1988  had risk-adjusted  capital  between 3 percent  and 6 
percent.  In sum, nearly  one-third  of all bank  assets at the end of the third 
quarter  1988  were  being  managed  by institutions  with  capital  ratios  below 
6 percent. Table 6 illustrates  that roughly $700 billion of these assets 
were concentrated  in 13  of the nation's 15  largest  banks. 
The FDIC's public  announcements  focus on the trouble  spots within 
the banking  industry  by citing  the list of "problem  banks," or those that 
receive substandard  ratings  from bank supervisors.  As shown in table 
7, the number  of problem  banks declined between 1987  and 1988,  from 
1,575 to 1,394. Still, after six years of the nation's longest peacetime 
economic expansion, the 1988  level of problem banks was more than 
three  times larger  than  the previous  postwar  high  of 385  recorded  in 1976 
and  more  than  six times higher  than  the level of 198  1.7  The large  number 
of problem  banks suggests that our data  on weakly capitalized  banks  in 
table 5 understate  the troubles  of the banking  industry. 
How great are the losses to which the FDIC, and ultimately the 
taxpaying  public, are exposed? To answer  this question, it is helpful  to 
look to the FDIC's prior  loss experience  for failed  bank  resolutions. 
During the  1980s the FDIC's ratio of losses  to bank assets has 
fluctuated  widely, from  a low of 10  percent  in 1981  and 1985  to a high  of 
75 percent in 1982  and 1984. Through 1987, the ratio has averaged  26 
percent. 
To be conservative,  we use here a range  of 15-30  percent  for the bank 
failure  resolution  cost ratio,  a range  that  brackets  the 26 percent  average 
and whose low end barely exceeds the lowest loss ratio (10 percent) 
experienced  in this decade. On  this basis, as of September  1988,  it would 
have cost $3.5-$7.0 billion  to close or assist the merger  of all insolvent 
banks shown in table 5. But even this estimated  cost range  is surely  too 
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Table  6. Ratio  of Risk-Adjusted  Tier I Capital  to Risk-Adjusted  Assets, 15 Largest  U.S. 
Commercial  Banksa 
Capital-to-assets 
ratio with  LDC  Capital-to-assets 
Total  reserve equal to  ratio assuming 
assets  50 percent of  50 percent of 
(billions  Capital-to-assets LDC exposure  LDC debt is 
Bank  of dollars)  ratio (percent)  (percent)  written  offb 
Citibank  153.8  3.98  2.82  3.21 
Bank of America  82.5  3.71  1.48  2.16 
Chase  77.3  5.41  3.08  3.61 
Morgan  71.4  6.89  n.a.  n.a. 
Manufacturers  61.8  5.31  1.44  2.34 
Bankers  Trust  56.7  4.64  2.63  3.23 
Chemical  54.3  4.06  1.90  2.45 
Security Pacific  51.0  3.85  3.85  3.85 
Wells Fargo  42.1  6.10  6.10  6.10 
Bank of New Yorkc  41.7  4.13  3.57  n.a. 
First National  Bank of 
Chicago  35.0  3.46  3.46  3.46 
Continental  Illinois  32.0  4.75  4.06  4.11 
First National  Bank of 
Boston  25.3  3.89  3.89  3.89 
NCNB of Texas  25.6  1.49  n.a.  n.a. 
Mellon  22.2  3.40  3.01  3.10 
Total assets  832.7  ...  .... 
Average capital  ratios  . . .  4.34  3.17  3.46 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data and assistance  from Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,  MBS Institutional 
Databank and Fixed  Income  Research;  First Boston  Corporation, Bank Hanidbook, March 1989. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Data shown  are most recent available and vary among the banks from year-end  1987 to year-end  1988. 
b.  Assumes  35 percent corporate tax rate. 
c.  Reflects  acquisition  of Irving Bank in 1988. 
low. The sample used for the calculations in table 5 does not include 
approximately  9,000  banks  with  assets below $50  million,  many  of which 
currently may have negative risk-adjusted  GAAP capital ratios. In 
addition, for the same reasons that GAAP accounting overstates the 
market  value net worth  of thrifts,  many  of the weakly capitalized  banks 
shown  in the table  also are  likely to be insolvent  on a market  value basis. 
Indeed, just  as thrift regulators implemented a policy of capital 
forbearance  throughout  the 1980s,  so too are bank  regulators  practicing 
forbearance  right  now. The  banks  currently  operating  with  negative  risk- 
adjusted capital ratios are the clearest examples of this forbearance R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Andrew S.  Carron, and Robert E. Litan  255 
Table 7.  FDIC-Insured Banks Closed Because of Financial Difficulties and Problem 
Banks, 1980-88 
Percent  Percent 
increase  Number  increase  Closed 
Number  over  of  over  and 
of closed  previous  problem  previous  problem 
Year  banks  year  banksa  year  banks 
1980  10  0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1981  10  0  223b  n.a.  233 
1982  42  320  369  65  411 
1983  48  14  642  74  690 
1984  80  67  848  32  928 
1985  120  50  1,140  34  1,260 
1986  145  21  1,484  30  1,629 
1987  203  40  1,575  6  1,778 
1988  221  89  1,394  -  11  1,615 
Sources:  For  1980-81,  FDIC (1982, p. 70); for 1982-87,  FDIC (1988a, pp. 3, 61); for  1988, FDIC (1988b, p. 5). 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  A bank accorded  either a "4"  or a "5"  under the Uniform Financial Institutions  Rating System  is considered 
a problem bank. 
b.  Before  1981 the problem list peaked at 385 in 1976 and declined  every  year through  1980. See  FDIC (1982, p. 
12). 
policy. Another  manifestation  of the same policy, shown in figure 1, is 
that regulators  have permitted  banks to maintain  dividends  even in the 
face of rising  loss provisions,  thus allowing  annual  additions  to retained 
earnings,  a part  of the capital  buffer  protecting  the FDIC, to shrink.  In 
fact, in 1987  when major  banks made major  additions  to their  loan loss 
reserves for less-developed country debt, regulators  did not require 
dividends to be suspended and thus permitted the level of retained 
earnings  to fall, in effect allowing  many  banks to dip into shareholders' 
equity  to pay dividends.8 
Bank regulation  has been replete with many other forms of forbear- 
ance, as the following five examples illustrate. First, the Competitive 
Equality Banking Act of  1987 ("CEBA") allows a bank to operate 
temporarily  with  a capital  ratio  as low as 0.5 percent  under  an authorized 
capital forbearance  program. In 1987 the FDIC broadened its  1986 
8. The  most  visible  example  of dividend  forbearance  is that  of Bank  of America,  which 
in 1985  paid  a dividend  of $1.16  a share  of common  stock despite  losses of $2.68  a share. 
See Sachs and Huizinga  (1987, p. 575). Dividends  were suspended  in 1986. However, 
based  on reported  income  gains  substantially  influenced  by GAAP  accounting  conventions 
and nonrecurring  gains, Bank of America  has indicated  a desire to resume its dividend 
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Figure 1.  Loss Provision, Additions to Retained Earnings, and Cash Dividends, Percent 
of Average Net Assets,  1977-87 
Percent  of average  net assets 
1.5 
1.0  / 
Loss  provision  / 
~~~~  ~~Additions  to retained  earnings 
.5 
-  ~~~~~~~~~~~~Cash  dividenids\ 
0.0 
1978  1980  1982  1984  1986 
Source:  Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System  (1980,  1983, 1988, table  1). 
forbearance eligibility guidelines, formerly applicable only to banks 
heavily involved in agricultural  and  energy  lending,  to include  any bank 
with difficulties  attributable  primarily  to "economic problems  beyond 
management  control.  " The  FDIC  has  extended  forbearance  to 135  banks 
under  this program.9  Second, the FDIC established  its first  bridge  bank 
in 1987. A bridge  bank is an insolvent institution  that instead of being 
closed in a traditional  manner  may remain open but operate under a 
board  of directors  appointed  by the FDIC. Third,  the FDIC, the Federal 
Reserve Board, and the Comptroller  of the Currency  adopted  rules in 
1987  that permit  agricultural  banks  with assets of $100  million  or less to 
amortize  farm-related  losses over a period  as long as seven years  instead 
of having to recognize them in the year in which they occurred.  10  The 
9.  FDIC (1988a, p. 7). 
10.  Christopher (1987, p. 19). R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Andrew S.  Carron, and Robert E. Litan  257 
unamortized  portions of losses are counted toward primary capital. 
Fourth, the valuation of troubled real estate in bank asset portfolios 
tends to be overstated  under  current  discounting  rules. Although  banks 
may not report  the value of such real estate in an amount  exceeding the 
present  value of expected cash flows (the "net realizable  value"), they 
may  discount  those flows at a 0 percent  discount  rate. In contrast,  thrifts 
must use the prevailing  cost of funds in their  Federal  Home Loan Bank 
district. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly  in the wake of the recent 
initiative  by the Treasury  Department  to encourage  banks to write off 
some of their  LDC debt voluntarily,  it is widely believed that  the largest 
banks still have underreserved  for losses on these loans. Sachs and 
Huizinga,  for example,  have shown  that  the secondary  market  discounts 
at year end 1986  for debt owed by the four largest debtors (Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela) ranged between 37 percent and 53 
percent  of the face value of the debt; in contrast,  even after  their major 
additions  to reserves in 1987, the nine money center banks had estab- 
lished  average  reserves  of only 16  percent.  1I1  Although  secondary  market 
prices for LDC debt must be viewed with some caution, given the 
thinness  of the market,  it is nevertheless  significant  that  average  second- 
ary market discounts on LDC debt have fallen since the Sachs and 
Huizinga  study, to a level now approaching  60 percent, roughly  twice 
current  loan loss reserves established by the money center lenders to 
LDCs. 
The third  column  of table 6 adjusts  the risk-adjusted  capital  ratios of 
the nation's 15  largest  banks  to reflect  LDC debt loan reserves equal to 
50  percent  of the  debt, or  the  ratios  generally  established  by large  regional 
banks  with significant  LDC debt exposure. The table illustrates  that  the 
average  capital  ratio  for this group  of banks  falls from  4.3 percent  to 3.2 
percent. Perhaps more significant,  the risk-adjusted  capital ratios for 
three banks, Bank of America, Chemical Bank, and Manufacturers 
Hanover,  fall below 2 percent. With  its significant  portfolio  of troubled 
domestic loans, Bank  of America  is realistically  at or near  market  value 
insolvency. The capital-to-asset  ratios improve slightly if, as shown in 
the last column of table 6, capital is adjusted upward to reflect tax 
benefits  if 50 percent  of LDC debt is actually  written  off. 
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The recent shift toward  voluntary  debt reduction  will not, by itself, 
change  the regulatory  policy of capital  forbearance  for the largest  banks. 
Press reports  indicate  that  Treasury  is attempting  to achieve an average 
write-off of 20 percent for LDC debt. Even if this comes about, the 
balance sheets of major banks will continue to provide misleading 
indications  of the value of such debt as long as loan loss reserves do not 
fully reflect  expected losses. 
In sum, bank  regulators  have acted much as thrift  regulators  have in 
pursuing  capital  policies, allowing  accounting  conventions, and  practic- 
ing other forms of forbearance that mask the true condition of the 
depository  institutions  they supervise.  Perhaps  most alarming  of all, the 
deterioration  of the capital  positions  of many  banks  has occurred  during 
the longest peacetime expansion in the nation's history. Many more 
banks  could approach  or reach  insolvency if the expansion  ends. 
The Administration's  Thrift Plan 
George Bush assumed the presidency in the midst of an immediate 
crisis among  the nation's  thrift  institutions,  and thus it is not surprising 
that  his administration  and  Congress  have since concentrated  primarily, 
if not exclusively, on resolving the problems  among  thrifts  and not the 
banks. In the last two months of 1988 depositors at thrift institutions 
were "running,  " or  withdrawing  from  their  accounts, at the rate  of about 
$7 billion a month. The pace of withdrawals  increased  in January  after 
the administration  floated  its ill-fated  proposal  to tax depositors  for the 
full cost of cleaning  up all insolvent thrifts, and withdrawals  rermained 
high through  the first quarter  of 1989. Meanwhile, after having denied 
the FSLIC sufficient monies to close  all insolvent thrifts, many in 
Congress  nevertheless  were furious  with the Federal  Home Loan Bank 
Board  for having  arranged  so many  assisted sales of failed  thrifts  to new 
owners during  1988  on seemingly  generous  terms. If nothing  else, these 
transactions  put Congress  in a receptive mood for authorizing  substan- 
tially  more  funds  to deal with the hundreds  of insolvent  thrifts  that  were 
still in business. 
In early February 1989 the administration  announced a plan for 
liquidating  or merging  the insolvent institutions  and for reforming  the 
regulatory  system to prevent another  such crisis. The plan proposed a R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Andrew S.  Carron, and Robert E. Litan  259 
somewhat complicated mechanism, largely designed to minimize its 
effect on the federal  budget,  for funding  the cleanup  of insolvent thrifts. 
A new agency, the Resolution  Finance  Corporation  (REFCORP)  would 
be created within the Treasury  Department  to issue $50 billion in 30- 
year bonds during  1989-9  1.  12  The proceeds from this bond issue would 
be channeled  to a new Resolution  Trust  Corporation  (RTC),  which, over 
the next three years, would liquidate  or assist the sale of approximately 
500 insolvent thrifts:  351 GAAP-insolvent  institutions  plus another 150 
thrifts  with negative tangible  net worth (GAAP net worth minus  good- 
will). Repayment of the principal  of the REFCORP  bonds would be 
effectively guaranteed  by REFCORP's  purchase of 30-year Treasury 
zero-coupon bonds. Funds for this purchase would be provided by 
contributions  from the Federal Home Loan (FHL) Banks, proceeds 
from  old FSLIC  receiverships,  and  FSLIC  insurance  premiums.  Interest 
on the REFCORP  bonds also would be funded  by annual  contributions 
by  the  FHL Banks  (beginning  in 1992),  proceeds  from  asset sales resulting 
from  new thrift  liquidations,  and  the Treasury. 
The plan  tapped  depository  institutions  for funds  as well. Thrifts  face 
an increase in their deposit insurance  premium  rate, from the current 
20.8 basis point level to 23 basis points through  calendar  1993  (but then 
a reduction  down to 18  basis points thereafter).  In addition,  because the 
FHL Banks are owned by thrifts, the required  Bank contributions  will 
effectively come out of the thrift  industry  itself.  13 According  to the plan, 
the thrift  premiums  will be used both to fulfill  commitments  made  by the 
FSLIC through  calendar  1988  to purchasers  of failed thrifts  and to fund 
the cleanup  of future  thrift  insolvencies not handled  by the RTC. 
Commercial  banks, meanwhile, were hit under the plan with an 
increase in their deposit insurance  premium  rate from the current  8.3 
basis point level up to 15 basis points by calendar  1991;  thereafter,  the 
rate  can be lowered  to the extent the FDIC's reserve  balance  equals 1.25 
percent  of the insured  deposit base. To avoid antagonizing  the banking 
industry, the plan makes clear that the additional FDIC premium 
revenues are not to be used to fund any thrift-related  expenditures. 
Instead,  the plan  seeks the increase  in  the bank  premium  rate  to replenish 
12. Unless otherwise  noted, all yearly  references  in this section  are  to fiscal  years. 
13. In calendar  1988,  FHL Bank  stock accounted  for one-third  of the thrift  industry's 
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the FDIC fund itself, whose reserves dropped  in 1988,  for the first  time 
since the fund  was created  in 1933. 
The administration's  original proposal also advanced a series of 
regulatory  reforms.  The most important  proposal  would have required 
all thrifts by June 1991 to meet the new risk-based  capital standards 
required for banks. In computing capital, thrifts would have been 
required  to amortize  their  goodwill  over 10 years, rather  than at the 40- 
year pace allowed under GAAP. The original plan also would have 
provided regulators  with the discretionary  authority  to place weakly 
capitalized, but still solvent, depository institutions  into conservator- 
ships, pending recapitalization  by their current owners, sale to new 
owners, or liquidation.  As we discuss in our  concluding  section, the final 
plan is likely to weaken each of these potentially  significant  reforms. 
Other  features of the final  plan, however, should mimic the original 
proposal. Penalties for violating thrift regulations  will be toughened. 
Additional  funding  to the Justice Department  will be made available  to 
permit prosecution of thrift owners and officers who violated certain 
criminal provisions. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board will be 
removed  as overseer of the FSLIC, and  the thrift  insurance  fund  will be 
placed  instead  under  the wings  of the FDIC. At the same  time, the three- 
member Bank Board will be dissolved, and a new Chairman  of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank System, responsible for chartering and 
regulating  thrifts, will be placed in the Treasury  Department,  as is the 
current  counterpart  for national  banks,  the Comptroller  of the Currency. 
The likely final  plan  will take no immediate  action on a wide range  of 
other possible reforms, including  alterations  to the deposit insurance 
system, to the current  financial  system itself, or to current  methods of 
accounting.  Instead, the Treasury  Department  will be directed  to study 
these matters  and  to report  its findings  to Congress  within 18  months. 
The Administration's  Cost Estimates 
Table 8 indicates  that the thrift  plan contemplates  the expenditure  of 
$136 billion during 1989-99 for "case resolutions"-liquidations  or 
assisted sales of insolvent  thrifts.  Of this total, an estimated  $112  billion 
represents  projected  cash outlays for immediate  past and current  prob- 
lems known as of early 1989:  $62 billion that the FSLIC must pay to R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Andrew S.  Carron, and Robert E. Litan  261 
Table 8.  Estimates of Uses and Sources of Funds under Administration's Thrift Plan  a 
Billions of current  dollars 
Use  and source  1989-94  1995-99  1989-99 
Use 
Case resolutions 
Guarantees  on 1988  cases  33.5  8.9  42.4 
Repay FSLIC notesb  1.9  17.3  19.2 
New cases 
RTC  50.0  0.0  50.0 
Post-RTC  10.0  14.0  24.0 
Subtotal  95.4  40.2  135.6 
Debt-service 
FICO  interest  5.6  5.1  10.7 
REFCORP  interest  17.2  19.2  36.4 
REFCORP  defeasance  6.0  0.0  6.0 
Interest  on Treasury  borrowingc  4.1  13.3  17.4 
Subtotal  32.9  37.6  70.5 
Total use of funds  128.2  77.7  206.0 
Source 
Income 
Thrift  deposit insurance  premiums  14.9  15.9  30.9 
Liquidation  proceeds  17.8  3.9  21.7 
Contributions  by Federal  Home 
Loan Banks  4.3  1.5  5.8 
Miscellaneous  income  2.5  2.1  4.6 
Subtotal  39.5  23.4  63.0 
Borrowing 
REFCORP  bonds  50.0  0.0  50.0 
FICO  bonds  7.1  0.0  7.1 
Treasury  borrowing  31.6  54.3  85.9 
Subtotal  88.7  54.3  143.0 
Total source of funds  128.2  77.7  206.0 
Sources:  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  and  Department  of  the  Treasury  for  all  figures  except  Treasury 
borrowing  and the  Treasury  interest  thereon,  which  are  both  calculated  under  the  administration's  interest  rate 
assumptions  (see  table 4). Details  may not sum to total because  of rounding. 
a.  All data are for fiscal years. 
b.  FSLIC  notes  issued  before  1989. 
c.  To pay REFCORP interest. 
fulfill  guarantees  and to redeem notes already  issued to purchasers  of 
failed thrifts  and another  $50 billion that the proposed  RTC will spend 
to liquidate  or merge  approximately  500 currently  insolvent thrifts  over 
the next three years. The present value of both categories  of projected 
expenditures, calculated under the administration's  interest rate as- 
sumptions (discussed below), is $92.4 billion. In addition, the plan 
projects  $24  billion  of additional  spending  ($17.2  billion  in present  value) 
through  1999  for future ("post-RTC")  thrift  insolvencies. In combina- 262  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1989 
tion, therefore, the administration's  estimates imply that the present 
value cost of paying  for all outstanding  obligations  and  for resolving  all 
thrift  insolvencies through  1999  is $109.6  billion. 
The Cash Flows 
Most of the popular  concern  and  debate  about  the cost of cleaning  up 
the thrift mess, however, has focused on the projected  current  dollar 
expenditures and budget effects of the plan. This is not surprising. 
Federal budgets must be set in current  dollars, not lump sum present 
values. Current  dollar expenditures are also more transparent  to the 
typical  voter. 
It is important  even for economists and policymakers  to know the 
time profile  over which funds  for the cleanup  are to be raised  and spent. 
The reason is that the present  value cost of removing  failed thrifts  from 
the system grows the longer action is delayed. For example, measured 
at book value, the negative net worth of the GAAP-insolvent  thrifts 
operating  at the close of 1988  more  than  doubled  in each of the previous 
two years.  14 As can be calculated  from  table 1, this group  of institutions 
reported  a negative 13.0 percent return  on assets. By comparison,  the 
negative GAAP net worth of these institutions  at the end of 1988  was 
11.6 percent. Even if the FDIC, which has since assumed control over 
many  of these institutions,  is able to cut these losses substantially  in the 
future  by limiting  the abilities  of insolvent  thrifts  to pay premium  interest 
rates to attract depositors and to take additional risks in their loan 
portfolios,  the negative  worth of these institutions  will almost certainly 
deteriorate  more sharply  than the prevailing  rate of interest. Clearly, 
therefore,  the more  rapidly  insolvent thrifts  can be put out of their (and 
our)  misery, the lower the ultimate  resolution  cost will be. 
The expenditure  projections  in table 8 indicate  that, in fact, the case 
resolution  costs are  front-loaded  into the first  6 years of the 1 -year  time 
horizon chosen by the administration  to present its cost and budget 
estimates. We prefer  even more front-loading  given the mounting  cost 
of further  delay. 
Table  8 shows that  the plan  also will require  an additional  $71  billion, 
most of it toward the end of the 11-year  period, primarily  to pay the 
14. Statement  of James L. Blum (Acting  Director)  before the Senate Committee  on 
Banking,  Housing,  and Urban  Affairs,  March  3, 1989,  p. 3. R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Andrew S.  Carron, and Robert E. Litan  263 
interest on the various bonds that will finance the case resolution 
expenditures.  These bonds include nearly  $11 billion in 30-year  instru- 
ments to be issued through  1990  by the Financing  Corporation  (FICO), 
a special FSLIC financing  affiliate  created  in 1987;  $50  billion  in 30-year 
bonds to be issued through  1991  by REFCORP,  the successor to FICO; 
and an estimated $86 billion in Treasury  bonds that we project (under 
the administration's  interest rate assumptions)  the federal  government 
must issue to finance its partial  funding of interest payments on the 
REFCORP  bonds.  15 
The administration's  official cost  projections do not include the 
interest  on borrowings  beyond those of REFCORP.  However, the plan 
itself authorizes  Treasury  to be the residual  funding  source-that  is, to 
make up any shortfall between funds raised from other sources and 
monies expended to resolve thrift  failures. Accordingly,  it is critically 
important  to taxpayers to know how much Treasury  borrowing  may 
actually be required. And since this borrowing  comes at a price, we 
believe it should be included in the cost estimates for the plan. In 
addition,  since it is unlikely  that taxes will be raised to cover the added 
interest  cost, the government  must instead  increase its borrowing  each 
year to cover it. The interest  on this additional  borrowing,  too, must be 
borrowed. It would be irresponsible  under  these circumstances  not to 
recognize  Treasury's  added  interest  obligations  as part  of the plan. 
In sum, the administration  projects  that  $143  billion  of the $206  billion 
in projected  expenditures  through  1999  must be financed.  The balance, 
an estimated  $63 billion, will be raised through  thrift  deposit insurance 
premiums, proceeds from the sale of assets inherited through thrift 
liquidations,  mandatory  contributions  from the Federal Home Loan 
Bank  System, and miscellaneous  sources. 
Budget Impact 
As already noted, the administration's  proposal was carefully de- 
signed not only to finance  the cleanup  of currently  insolvent thrifts  but 
to minimize  its budgetary  impact. 
First, it follows the tradition  set by Congress  and the administration 
15. Of the $71  billion  in projected  debt service, $6 billion  is earmarked  for defeasance 
of the REFCORP  bonds: the purchase  of 30-year  zero coupons at the outset that will 
mature  into $50 billion  in 30 years and thus fund the repayment  of the REFCORP  bond 
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in creating FICO, an agency expressly structured  to issue bonds off 
budget and to hand over the proceeds to the FSLIC, by using the new 
REFCORP  to fulfill  the same  function,  but  with  nearly  a fivefold  increase 
in borrowing  authority.  Accordingly,  the administration  claims that the 
$50  billion  in REFCORP  bonds also will be off-budget.  16 
Second, the plan records on-budget  only that portion  of the interest 
on the REFCORP  bonds that is paid by the Treasury.  The rest of the 
interest  is to be funded  from  contributions  from  the Federal  Home Loan 
Banks  and  from  asset recoveries  on future  case resolutions,  monies that 
are channeled  directly  into REFCORP  and thus are off-budget. 
Third,  although  it is not used for thrift-related  expenses, the increase 
in bank  deposit  insurance  premiums  nevertheless  reduces  the budgetary 
impact  of the plan. Under  budget  accounting  conventions  in place since 
1969,  all revenues and expenses of both the FSLIC and the FDIC show 
up on the federal  budget. Accordingly,  the incremental  FDIC premium 
collections add  to federal  revenues. 
These three features of the plan combine to reduce the official net 
budget outlays to just $41 billion over the 11-year  period, as shown in 
table 9.17  In addition, the net outlays display an unusual time profile 
because of the timing of the REFCORP bond proceeds, which are 
counted  as federal  revenues, and  case resolutions  by the FSLIC and  the 
RTC. Thus, after commencing  at nearly $11 billion in 1989, officially 
reported  net outlays actually  fall to less than  $3 billion  in 1990  and even 
less by 1994. 
However, official  net outlays understate  the true  expense of the thrift 
plan  on the federal  budget.  In significant  part,  this is because the official 
figures  do not count the interest obligations  on Treasury  borrowings, 
16. The  Congressional  Budget  Office  disputes  this  accounting  procedure,  as discussed 
later  in the text. FICO  is technically  a privately  owned corporation  whose equity  is held 
by the Federal Home Loan Banks, which in turn are owned by privately held thrift 
institutions.  REFCORP,  however, would be a governmental  entity within  the Treasury 
Department.  Accordingly,  CBO  has urged  that  REFCORP  bonds  be treated  as obligations 
of the U.S. government  and placed on budget  but that REFCORP  expenditures  not be 
counted  against  the budget  deficit  targets  of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  Act. In June 
1989 the House of Representatives  voted to accept this procedure. At this writing, 
however,  it is unclear  whether  the final  bill  will  follow this approach. 
17. The official  administration  projections  show an 11-year  revenue  increase  in FDIC 
premium  revenue  of $19.9  billion.  Our  figure  of $19  billion  is modestly  lower because the 
administration's  calculations  for the first  two years of the plan  err  in translating  calendar 
year  deposit  insurance  assessment  periods  to fiscal  year  budget  periods. 266  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Table 10.  Cost-Sharing under the Administrations's Thrift Plan,  1989-99a 
Source  1989-94  1995-99  1989-99 
Billions of current  dollars 
Treasury  borrowing  (taxpayers)  31.6  54.3  85.9 
Thrifts  (increased  premiums  and FHLB  13.9  5.8  19.6 
contributions) 
Banks (increased  premiums)  7.1  11.9  19.0 
Total  52.6  72.0  124.6 
Per-cent 
Treasury  borrowing  (taxpayers)  60  75  69 
Thrifts  26  8  16 
Banks  13  17  15 
Total  100  100  100 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from tables 8 and 9, and Office of Management and Budget. 
a.  All data are for fiscal years.  Details  may not sum to totals because  of roundings. 
which,  as table 9 indicates,  bring the estimated  11-year total up to $58 
billion. 
An even  more revealing way to look  at the budget figures is to ask 
how the cost burden for financing the cleanup is shared among taxpay- 
ers, thrifts, and banks. Table 10 provides  an answer.  Over the  11-year 
horizon,  taxpayers  bear nearly 70 percent  of the incremental  costs."8 
The  taxpayer  share  would  be  somewhat  higher if  the  above  budget 
estimates  took account of forgone tax revenues from the tax-assistance 
benefits provided to purchasers of failed thrifts and from the reduction 
in thrifts' taxable income resulting from lower FHL Bank dividends and 
higher insurance premiums. Moreover,  since taxpayers and depositors 
are largely identical groups, the taxpayer-depositor burden is even higher 
to the extent that banks and thrifts pass on, in the form of lower deposit 
interest  rates,  the increased  premium assessments  and other cost  in- 
creases called for under the plan. 
A More  Realistic  Look  at the Cost of Resolving  the Thrift  Crisis 
The administration's  cost  and budget estimates  rest on a series  of 
assumptions,  shown in table  11, about the nature of the thrift problem 
itself and about future economic  conditions.  These  assumptions  have 
three different effects:  some  affect the total cost  of the thrift cleanup; 
18. These calculations  look at only the costs that  are incremental  to the situation  that 
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Table 11. Assumptions  Underlying  Administration  and Alternative  Estimates  of the Cost 
and Budget  Impact  of Addressing  the Thrift  Crisis 
Assumption 
Item  Administration  Alternative 
Assumptions  affecting total cost 
Closure  candidates 
Immediate  351 GAAP insolvents with  Same as administration 
$107 billion  in assets; 
150  tangible  GAAP 
insolvents  with $158 
billion  in assets 
Future  200 weakly capitalized  Same as administration 
with $100 billion  in assets 
Ratio of losses to total assets 
Case resolutions  in 1988  0.26  0.30 
Current  GAAP in-  0.40  0.45 
solvents 
Additional  tangible 
inisolvents  0.15  0.25 
Future  failures  0.075  0.15 
Interest  rates (percent) 
FICO rates (1989-90)  9.2  9.2 
REFCORP  rates  9.1 (1989)  declining  CBO:  9.2 (1989)  down to 
to 6.5 (1991)  8.6 (1991) 
Current  yield curve: 9.0 
(1989)  rising  to 9.5 
(1991) 
30-year  Treasury  rates  8.8 (1989)  declining  CBO:  9.2 (1989)  down to 
to 5.0 (1992-99)  7.4 (1994  and beyond) 
Current  yield curve: 
roughly  9 for whole 
period 
Rate on FSLIC notes  9.5 (1989)  declining  to 4.0  CBO:  9.3 (1989)  down to 
(1994-99)  7.4 (1994  and beyond) 
Current  yield curve: 
roughly  9.0 
Assumptions  affecting the distribution  of cost 
Annual  growth  rate in 
insured  bank  deposits (percent)  6.9  6.9 
Annual  growth  rate in 
insured  thrift  deposits 
(percent)  7.2  4.0 
Assumption  affecting budget impact  only 
Incremental  FDIC 
collections required  for 
future  bank  failures  None  Half 
Source:  Treasury Department and Congressional  Budget Office. 268  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1989 
others  affect  how the responsibility  for the cost is split  among  taxpayers, 
thrifts,  and  banks;  and  at least one assumption  affects  only the budgetary 
impact of the plan (but not its cost). Most of these assumptions  have 
been made public. In cases where they have not, the table presents our 
inferences  from  what  else is known  about  the plan. 
We argue below that the administration's  assumptions paint an 
unrealistically  optimistic  cost and budget  outlook  for its plan. We come 
to this conclusion  in full  recognition  of the uncertainty  surrounding  each 
of the key assumptions  and  thus  of the probabilistic  nature  of the ultimate 
cleanup  cost. Nevertheless, it is important  for economic, if not also for 
political, reasons  for policymakers  and the public  to know at the outset 
what the thrift  cleanup  eventually  is most likely to cost. 
Although  the plan  authorizes  the Treasury  to fund  any shortfall  in the 
cleanup effort not funded by other sources, apparently  only the REF- 
CORP  interest  payments  will have a multiyear  appropriation.  Congress 
must still appropriate  any additional  monies that may be required  in the 
future. If the plan is initially  underfunded,  such appropriations  may be 
required  as early  as fiscal  year 1992,  the year  before  the next presidential 
election. Such timing does not bode well for taxpayers. During the 
presidential  election  yearjust  past, both  Congress  and  the  administration 
faced an underfunded  FSLIC but chose to avoid the political conse- 
quences  of providing  it with  sufficient  resources  to deal  with  the  problems 
it faced. As a result, hundreds  of insolvent thrifts  have been permitted 
to remain  in operation,  adding  to the losses that must now be covered 
largely  by taxpayers.  We fear a similar  outcome three years hence if we 
are correct that the final plan fails to provide sufficient  resources up- 
front quickly to remove all insolvent depositories from the financial 
system. 
Administration Assumptions 
The  present  value  cost of cleaning  up  the thrift  mess will  be determined 
by three factors: the number  of institutions  that must be liquidated  or 
sold and the assets they hold; the cost of removing  these institutions  as 
a percentage  of their  assets (the loss ratios);  and  future  interest  rates. 
The administration  proposes to deal with 700 thrifts over the next 
decade: 351 GAAP-insolvent and an additional 150 tangible GAAP- 
insolvent institutions  over the next three years; and 200 more thrifts, 
currently  GAAP-solvent  but unprofitable,  through  1999.  Table 11 indi- R. Dan Brumbaugh,  Jr., Andrew  S. Carron,  and Robert E. Litan  269 
cates that, in the aggregate,  these 700 institutions  held $365 billion in 
assets at the end of 1988. 
The administration  does not officially  report  the loss ratios  it expects 
on the assets held by the thrifts in each of these three categories. 
However, these ratios  can be inferred  by dividing  the projected  expen- 
ditures  for resolving  these institutions  by the total assets held, and then 
allocating  varying  percentages  to each category. The administration's 
assumptions  thus inferred  are 40 percent for current  GAAP-insolvent 
institutions;  15  percent  for  the additional  tangible  GAAP-insolvents;  and 
7.5 percent  for the future  insolvent  thrifts.  Unlike the loss ratios shown 
in table 4 above, which were stated  in present value terms, the ratios in 
table 11  refer  to current  dollar  costs. 
As shown in table 11, the administration  projects steadily declining 
interest  rates, both short-  and long-term.  The level of interest  rates will 
not affect the present value cost of financing  most of the plan since as 
interest rates on the Treasury  and REFCORP  borrowings  change, so 
will the rate at which future outlays are discounted. However, the 
interest  rate  on notes issued by the FSLIC to purchasers  of failed thrifts 
before 1989  do not vary exactly with the long-term  rates at which those 
outlays  are discounted. 
The administration  assumes that deposits at both banks and thrifts 
over the next decade  will  grow  at roughly  the same  rate  as nominal  GNP, 
or in the range of 7 percent a year. However, somewhat surprisingly, 
the projection  for annual  thrift  deposit growth (7.2 percent) is slightly 
higher  than  that  for banks  (6.9 percent).  These growth  rate  assumptions 
do not affect the size of the resolution  cost, but they do affect how the 
responsibility  for financing  the cleanup  is split  among  taxpayers,  thrifts, 
and  banks. 
Finally, the administration  assumes that the additional revenues 
earned  by the FDIC  from  higher  deposit insurance  assessments will not 
be dissipated  in any way by higher  bank failure  resolution  costs. This 
allows the administration  to offset, for budget  accounting  purposes, the 
incremental  FDIC premiums  against the outlays required  for the thrift 
cleanup. 
Alternative Assumptions 
Table 11 outlines what we believe are reasonable,  and indeed more 
likely, assumptions  for estimating  the cost and budgetary  impact  of the 270  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Figure 2.  Alternative Interest Rate Projections,  1988-2018a 
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Brady (Secretary  of the Treasury) before  the Senate  Committee  on Banking, Housing,  and Urban Affairs, February 
22,  1989. 
a.  Rates on  10-year Treasury bills. 
thrift package or a rescue effort like it. The differences between the 
administration  and  the alternative  assumptions  fall into  three  categories. 
First, the alternative  loss ratios range  between 4 and 10 percentage 
points higher than the administration  assumptions, depending  on the 
category  of thrift.  At a minimum,  the difference  between the alternative 
and administration  loss ratios for current  and future  thrift  insolvencies 
can be interpreted  as a cost of not immediately  closing or merging  all 
insolvent thrifts. For example, currently  insolvent thrifts  reported  net 
operating  losses in 1988  of $4 billion, or roughly  4 percent  of assets. At 
this rate, the loss ratios could easily mount  beyond those shown under 
our  alternative  assumptions.  Our  higher  loss ratios  can  also  be interpreted 
as more  realistic  assessments  of the  likely  losses to the FSLIC,  consistent 
with our cost projections  in table 4, even if all thrift  insolvencies were 
immediately  addressed. 
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assumptions,  those projected  by the Congressional  Budget Office and 
those implied by the Treasury yield curve, as of mid-February  1989 
when the administration's  thrift  plan  was announced. 
Finally, our alternative  assumptions  allow for slower annual  growth 
in thrift  deposits-a  continuation  of the 4 percent rate recorded  in 1988 
rather  than  the administration's  7.2 percent. It is difficult  to believe that 
with the planned  removal of at least 700 of the nation's roughly  2,900 
thrifts  over the next decade, coupled with the stiffer capital standards 
that should  constrain  the growth  rate of weak thrifts,  the thrift  industry 
can not only increase its deposit growth  rate well above the 1988  level 
but grow even faster than bank deposits, as the administration's  plan 
projects. 
The administration's  assumptions  that the incremental  $19 billion  in 
bank  deposit insurance  premiums  will offset the budgetary  impact  of the 
thrift cleanup effort, meanwhile, can be misleading. The proposed 
legislation would rebate premiums when the bank insurance fund is 
replenished  to a level equal  to 1.25  percent  of insured  deposits (the final 
plan should deviate from this slightly). If the rebates occur, then the 
estimates of FDIC's incremental  revenues appear  to be overstated. If 
the rebates are not forthcoming  because the FDIC's losses and admin- 
istrative  expenses prevent  the  fund  from  attaining  the 1.25  percent  target, 
then those losses and expenses will diminish  the net revenue  gain from 
the higher  premiums.  19 
Our  alternative  simulations  of the cost and budgetary  impact of the 
thrift  cleanup  do not account for the possibility that the administration 
may be understating  the number  of insolvent thrifts  that both now and 
in the future may have to be removed from the financial system. 
Admittedly,  this is a significant  omission  given the fact noted  earlier  that 
nearly 80 percent of the industry's assets are now being managed  by 
institutions  with tangible  capital  ratios below 3 percent. Nevertheless, 
we have chosen to be conservative in constructing our alternative 
scenarios  by sticking  with the administration's  assumption  that  over the 
next decade only 700 institutions  will be merged  or liquidated. 
Table  12  summarizes  the results  of applying  these alternative  assump- 
19. We estimate  that the fund would have to incur  cumulative  insurance  losses and 
administrative  expenses exceeding $35 billion  between 1990  and 1999  to avoid reaching 
the 1.25  percent  target  by 1999.  This  calculation  assumes  that  the FDIC  fund,  which  totaled 
$15.5 billion  at the end of fiscal 1989,  will collect deposits growing  at 6.9 percent  a year 
and  that  insured  deposits  remain  at roughly  75 percent  of total  domestic  deposits. at  Oe  -  0 
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tions, in isolation and in combination.  The first two columns show the 
cumulative current dollar and present value costs,  respectively, for 
1989-99.20 These two columns  concentrate  only on the resolution  costs 
for removing  problem  thrifts  from the system and thus do not include 
interest on FICO, REFCORP,  or Treasury  borrowings.  The third  col- 
umn,  which shows the cumulative  budget  outlays  through  1999,  includes 
these interest items, but allows for offsetting  reductions  in the form of 
deposit insurance  premium  assessments (including  assessments by the 
FDIC that technically  are not being devoted to the thrift  cleanup). The 
final  columns show how the incremental  cleanup cost is shared  among 
taxpayers,  banks, and  thrifts. 
The table  illustrates  that  of all the alternative  assumptions,  the higher 
loss ratios  make  the most  difference  to the cost estimates,  adding  roughly 
$33  billion  and  $24  billion  to the 11-year  current  and  present  value costs, 
respectively.  The cost difference  between scenarios  2 and  3, or about  $5 
billion  in present  value, measures  the added  cost due solely to the higher 
loss ratio on the 200 weakly capitalized  thrifts that the administration 
plans to deal with over the full  11-year period. Alternatively, this 
difference  may be viewed as the price  of delaying  the resolution  of these 
cases, assuming  that they could be resolved immediately  at a loss ratio 
of only 7.5 percent  (the  administration's  assumption).  Again,  we empha- 
size that  our alternative  assumptions  may understate  the cost estimates 
because we do not account  for the possibility  of additional  failed thrifts 
beyond  those assumed  by the administration. 
The budget picture painted by the table illustrates that the higher 
interest  rate  assumptions  have by far the greatest  imrpact  on cumulative 
outlays. For example, outlays under the rates implied by the mid- 
February  yield curve are more than  twice as high  as under  the adminis- 
tration's plan over the  11-year period. Even these projections are 
conservative, however. Our  analysis does not account for the fact that 
as interest  rates  increase,  most institutions  that  are  already  market  value 
insolvent  and are taking  interest  rate  bets become even more  insolvent, 
nor  for the fact that  additional  institutions  that may  currently  be solvent 
on a market  value basis will dip into insolvency as their liability  costs 
rise above their  asset earnings. 
20. The discount rates used in computing  the present value costs are the assumed 
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The combination  of all alternative  assumptions  yields higher  current 
dollar costs over the full period of approximately  $50 billion, but an 
additional  present value cost of only about $20 billion. The latter  figure 
comports  with the margin  by which our "middle"  cost scenario  in table 
4 exceeds the present  value cost under  the low scenario. 
In all the alternative  scenarios the relative taxpayer contribution  is 
higher than the administration  projects. In the combination scenario 
taxpayers  end up with  85  percent  of the incremental  cost, compared  with 
68 percent  under  the administration's  assumptions. 
Finally, the plan's issuance of bonds through  an off-budget  agency 
has  been  attacked  as a more  expensive, if not  misleading,  way of financing 
the rescue  effort.  Even the administration  has admitted  that  the premium 
over Treasury  interest rates that the REFCORP  bonds would require 
would add at least $2 billion  in present  value to the lifetime  interest  cost 
of the plan.  Yet the administration  has defended  the off-budget  financing 
mechanism  as necessary to avoid crippling  efforts to meet the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings  (GRH) budget deficit reduction targets. And the 
Treasury  Department  has asserted  that  raising  the funds through  Treas- 
ury borrowing would raise interest rates and unsettle the financial 
markets. 
Both  concerns  are  misplaced.  The initial  bond  issue, whether  through 
the Treasury or REFCORP, should have no macroeconomic  impact 
since the demand  for credit  it adds  to the market  would  be exactly offset 
by the added supply  when the insurance  agencies pay off depositors  or 
assist new owners of failed thrifts.21  Moreover, the capital  markets  are 
already anticipating  the new borrowing, in whatever form it comes. 
Meanwhile,  problems  meeting the GRH targets can easily be avoided 
through  an amendment  that would temporarily  raise the targets solely 
for this purpose,  or by issuing  the bonds between the GRH  certification 
date and the end of the fiscal year. In short, there is no reason why 
taxpayers  should  have to pay at least $2 billion  in additional  interest so 
the  federal  government  can  engage  in  what  amounts  to phony  accounting. 
A related  question  is the time period  over which the bonds should  be 
issued. Given the mounting  costs of delay, some members  of Congress 
have proposed authorizing  the $50 billion  bond issue in the first  year of 
the plan, rather  than  to spread  out the financing  over the proposed  three 
years. This, too, could  be accomplished  without  affecting  credit  markets 
21. For a thorough  treatment  of this issue, see Woodward  (1989). R. Dan Bruambaugh,  Jr., Andrew S.  Carron, and Robert E. Litan  275 
if the money raised  were spent rapidly  (on liquidations  and mergers)  or 
reinvested  in other  government  securities  pending  disbursement. 
Nonfinancial  Aspects of the Thrift Cleanup Effort 
Once the cleanup of currently insolvent thrifts is completed, the 
central  policy challenge  will be to prevent  another  crisis, whether  among 
thrifts  or banks. That  can be accomplished  only if the incentives  for risk 
taking  due to deposit insurance  are properly  offset by effective combi- 
nations  of market  and  regulatory  discipline. 
Space is too short here to permit a full treatment  of these issues, 
which  we and  others  have explored  elsewhere.22  Nevertheless, our  basic 
outlook  can be easily summarized. 
In brief, we believe shareholders,  backed  up by a strong  supervisory 
and  regulatory  system, should  be the primary  source  of discipline  against 
excessive risk taking by insured depositories. The history of banking 
clearly  demonstrates  that  when owners of depositories  have substantial 
capital  at risk, prudent  behavior  is the norm  rather  than the exception. 
Indeed,  it is no accident  that  in the extensive literature  on bank  failures, 
capital  levels one or two years in advance  of failure  consistently  turn  out 
to out to be among  the best predictors  of future  trouble.23  Significantly, 
strong  capital ratios also provide a cushion against loss to the deposit 
insurance  agency. 
In principle,  depositor  discipline  could also be enhanced  by lowering 
the current  $100,000  ceiling on deposit insurance  for accounts  at banks, 
thrifts,  and  credit  unions.24  In practice,  however, a lower  ceiling  will not 
have its intended  effect unless federal regulators  refrain  from merging 
failed  depositories  with  healthier  partners  (thus  effectively guaranteeing 
even uninsured  depositors  and creditors)  and from announcing  protec- 
tion of uninsured  depositors,  as they did  for Continental  Illinois  Bank  in 
1984 and more recently for American  Savings and Loan of California 
and  First  Republic  Bank  of Texas in 1988. 
Moreover,  there  is an unresolved  debate  about  the wisdom  of increas- 
22. Brumbaugh  and Carron  (1987);  Brumbaugh  and Litan (1989);  and Benston and 
others  (1989). 
23. For a listing  of these studies, see Barth  and  others  (1988). 
24. This  is recommended  in the  Economic  Report  of the  President  (1989,  pp. 203-04). 276  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
ing reliance  on depositor  discipline, even if it could be achieved. Some 
argue that runs on individual  institutions can be healthy because the 
possibility that they can occur gives owners and managers  reason to 
exercise greater  caution.  The systemwide  risks, they argue,  are minimal 
because runs  on individual  banks  should  have no effects on rational  and 
fully informed  depositors  at other  institutions. 
Others  are more  skeptical  and  fear  greater  macroeconomic  distress if 
individual  large  institutions  experience a run. In a world  where holders 
of uninsured  accounts can move their  money virtually  instantaneously, 
even a scintilla  of doubt  about  the health  of an institution  generated  by a 
run  on another  can motivate  transfers  of billions  of dollars  on extremely 
short  notice. To be sure, the Federal  Reserve can prevent  a systemwide 
run  by opening  its discount  window  to other  healthy  institutions,  but  the 
publicity surrounding  that effort and the runs that cause it may have 
unsettling  effects on financial  and exchange markets  that policymakers 
tend to find  worrisome.  Indeed, even in previous financial  crises when 
the Federal  Reserve has stepped  in, investors  have demanded  increases 
of at least 100  basis points in the premium  over Treasury  interest rates 
to be induced to hold bank certificates  of deposit and corporate  com- 
mercial  paper. Although  such increases tend to be short-lived,  lasting 
perhaps  no more than three months, they can have undesirable  short- 
term  macroeconomic  effects.25 
Wherever  one comes down on the merits  of depositor  discipline, the 
issue can be largely  mooted  by effective  enforcement  of capital  standards. 
In our minds, this can be achieved only if several major reforms to 
current  procedures  are adopted.26 
First,  capital-short  depository  institutions  must  face explicit  penalties 
until  they comply  with  prevailing  standards.  They must  not be permitted 
to pay dividends. And they must limit their asset and liability  growth 
until  their  capital  is sufficient. 
Second, regulators must be required to  assume control over an 
institution  short of its insolvency, or before market  value losses have 
mounted.  To be truly effective, such an early intervention  policy must 
be mandatory to minimize political interference in efforts by bank 
25. Carron  (1982). 
26. These  reforms  have  been urged  recently  by many  commentators.  See Benston  and 
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regulators  to thwart additional  risk taking. The conservatorships  for 
weakly capitalized  institutions  would be in place until the institutions 
were recapitalized  by existing  owners, auctioned  to new purchasers,  or 
if all  else fails, liquidated  by the insurer.  In  the event of sale  or  liquidation, 
the old owners would receive any net proceeds to avoid constitutional 
due process objections. 
Third, regulators  must move toward market  value accounting  as a 
basis for setting and enforcing  capital  standards.  The preceding  discus- 
sion amply demonstrates  that an insolvent institution's  assets can be 
depleted by 20 percent or more compared  with GAAP measures  of net 
worth.  Under  these circumstances,  it makes  little  sense for  the insurance 
agencies to wait until an institution's  GAAP net worth  falls below zero 
before  forcing  its merger  or liquidation. 
We do not discuss here the many  practical  objections  that  have been 
raised against market  value accounting,  principally  the complaint  that 
many assets held by depository institutions  are illiquid  and cannot be 
sold in a well-developed secondary market. Suffice it to say here that 
these objections  are overstated.27  Assets, such as mortgages,  for which 
comparable  instruments  are traded  in secondary  markets  can be given a 
market  value. And assets that  do not meet this test can at least be stated 
at their discounted present value, using prevailing  interest rates. The 
same can be done for liabilities. In the end, it is far better to use an 
accounting  system that provides a good approximation  to the measure 
insurers  and regulators  should care about-market value net worth- 
than to rely on precise, but potentially  misleading,  GAAP-based  mea- 
surements. 
By the above standards,  the final thrift  package that is likely to be 
passed by Congress  should  fall woefully short  in a number  of respects. 
Capital Standards 
The administration  plan would have required  thrifts  to meet by June 
1991  the higher  of the risk-adjusted  capital  standards  applicable  to banks 
or a 3 percent capital-to-asset  ratio. Thrift  capital  was to be analogous 
to Tier I, or "core," bank  capital, or common and preferred  stock and 
retained  earnings.  Since no more  than  0.25  percent  of the capital  standard 
27. For an excellent  treatment  of this issue, see White  (1988). 278  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1989 
could be met by goodwill, which the administration  proposed  be amor- 
tized over 10 years, rather  than the 40 years allowed under  GAAP, the 
administration's  proposal  established  a 2.75 percent minimum  tangible 
capital  requirement  effective in 1991. 
The  capital  proposal  was perhaps  the most  intensively  lobbied  feature 
of the administration's  plan in Congress. The Senate weakened the 
proposal considerably by lowering the tangible capital requirement 
applicable  in 1991 and beyond to 1.5 percent and allowing a 25-year 
amortization  period  for goodwill. The House took a tougher  stance: a 3 
percent  tangible  requirement  phased  in by 1995  with  goodwill  amortized 
only over five years. Both legislative alternatives require thrifts not 
meeting  the standards  to be subject  to growth  restrictions  and to other 
limits, within the regulators' discretion. Given the intense publicity 
about the capital issue and eleventh-hour  lobbying by the president 
himself, it is likely that  when a final  compromise  bill is agreed  upon, the 
capital  standards  will  end  up  closer to the House than  the Senate  version. 
In  light  of the severe moral  hazard  problems  generated  by weak  capital 
standards  of the past, we believe that any weakening  of the administra- 
tion's proposal  would be a dangerous  mistake. Although  the final  bill is 
likely to give regulators  some additional  ammunition  to rein in abuses 
by weakly capitalized  institutions,  the regulators  still will be unable to 
monitor  and control all potentially  destructive  risk taking  by managers 
with incentives to take risks. A far better  approach  would be to provide 
mandatory  penalties and limitations  to weakly capitalized  institutions, 
including  early  intervention,  and  to move toward  (and  not merely  study) 
the use of market  value accounting. 
Other Reforms 
The administration's  thrift  plan  acknowledges  that  more  fundamental 
changes in thrift  and bank regulation  may be needed, but it ducks the 
controversial  questions by relegating  them to a Treasury  Department 
study to be completed within 18 months after implementing  legislation 
is enacted. Among  the topics to be studied  are  deposit  insurance  reform, 
presumably either risk-based deposit insurance premiums or lower 
insurance  ceilings or both; market  value accounting;  and restructuring 
of  the nation's patchwork of laws governing competition between 
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Without  extensively discussing these issues here, it suffices to say 
that  substantial  changes  in deposit  insurance,  however  desirable  on their 
own merits, would not be necessary if an effective regime of capital 
standards  enforcement  were implemented.  Meanwhile, reform of the 
antiquated  "product-line"  restrictions  in the financial  services industry 
is long overdue. The current  system is riddled  with loopholes, leads to 
inefficiency, and may protect different sectors from competition. We 
prefer  a voluntary  system, much  like  that  suggested  in  a recent  Brookings 
publication,  that would allow depository organizations  to engage in a 
broad  range  of financial  and even nonfinancial  activities, provided  they 
limit the investments of their depositories to marketable  assets.28  This 
would  effectively limit  risks  to the deposit insurance  system from  losses 
incurred  in nonbank  activities  because  the net worth  of such  depositories 
would be easily valued and thus the regulators  would have little trouble 
taking  prompt,  early action in the event net worth  falls to a dangerously 
low level. 
The Threat of Reregulation 
To qualify  under  current  law for broader  investment  authority  at the 
holding  company  level, for certain  special tax benefits (primarily  more 
liberal  treatment  of loan loss reserves than is allowed for commercial 
banks),  and  for borrowing  privileges  from  the FHL Bank  System, thrifts 
must  invest at least 60 percent  of their  assets in residential  mortgages  or 
securities backed by residential  mortgages  and certain other assets.29 
The administration's  thrift  plan  would  retain  the present  "qualified  thrift 
lender"  (QTL)  test and  require  any thrift  not meeting  it to forfeit  its thrift 
charter,  and  thus its tax benefits  and  FHL System borrowing  privileges, 
and  also to pay fees to exit the FSLIC and  enter  the FDIC. 
Critics  of this aspect of this plan, however, have argued  that the 60 
percent  QTL  is too permissive,  pointing  to such evidence as is displayed 
in table 13. Although all thrifts have moved away from residential 
28. See Benston  and  others  (1989). 
29. Organizations  owning  a single thrift,  or "unitary  thrift  holding  companies,"  are 
also exempted  from  any activity  restrictions  only as long as the thrifts  they own meet the 
60 percent  test. In contrast, multi-thrift  holding  companies,  as well as all bank holding 
companies,  must confine  their  nondepository  subsidiaries  to a relatively  restricted  list of 
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Table 13. Asset  Investments  of Solvent  and Insolvent  Thrifts, 1982, 1987 
Percent 
Solvent thrifts  Insolvent  thrifts 
Asset  1982  1987  1982  1987 
Cash and securities  11.3  13.3  10.5  11.5 
Mortgage  assets  77.9  72.2  73.3  63.4 
Residential  ...  46.3  ...  31.3 
Commercial  ...  9.9  ...  14.5 
Mortgage-backed  securities  8.0  15.3  13.2  16.4 
Other  0.6  0.7  0.7  1.2 
Consumer  loans  2.7  4.4  2.9  3.8 
Commercial  loans (nonmortgage)  0  1.7  0  1.9 
Direct investments  1.2  2.2  1.2  4.4 
Junk  bonds  . . .  1.1  . . .  0.2 
Repossessed assets  0.4  0.9  0.5  7.8 
Other  6.5  4.2  11.6  7.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source:  Barth and Bradley (1988). Solvency  determined under generally accepted  accounting  principles.  "Other" 
assets  include goodwill  and other intangible assets,  fixed assets,  real estate,  deferred net losses,  and assets  sold. 
mortgage  investments, the table shows that insolvent thrifts  have gone 
to considerably  greater  lengths in this direction  than  have their solvent 
counterparts.  From this evidence, it is argued  that the QTL should be 
raised.  At this writing  it appears  that  the final  thrift  plan  will move in this 
direction. 
We believe raising  the QTL  is a mistake.  First, it is incorrect  to place 
the blame for the insolvency of much of the thrift  industry  on broader 
asset powers per se. The real  culprits  are  the misguided  policy of capital 
forbearance,  which  allowed  hundreds  of insolvent  or weakly  capitalized 
thrifts  to abuse  the moral  hazard  features  of deposit  insurance,  combined 
with inadequate  supervision. Table 13 illustrates  that well-capitalized 
thrifts  did not plunge so deeply into higher risk investments precisely 
because their  owners had something  to lose. 
Second, raising  the QTL would only force thrifts  to take more of the 
kind  of interest  rate  bets that virtually  brought  down the entire  industry 
in the early 1980s when short-term  deposit rates soared above the 
relatively  low rates thrifts  were locked into earning  on their long-term 
fixed-rate  mortgages.  The  evolution  of adjustable  rate  mortgages  (ARMs) 
has mitigated,  but  has not eliminated,  this risk  because most ARMs  have 
fixed-rate  features. In particular,  the typical  ARM  has an annual  cap on 
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the interest  rate  over the lifetime  of the mortgage  of 6 percent.  Moreover, 
many thrifts have competed for ARM originations  by promising  low 
initial  "teaser" rates. In combination,  these features  of ARMs  can leave 
their holders with significant  adverse exposure to increases in funding 
costs.30 
Third,  somewhat  ironically  in view of the objectives  of its supporters, 
a higher QTL will only depress thrift profitability  and conceivably 
threaten  the  viability  of the  remaining  healthy  thrifts.  Now that  mortgages 
can be easily originated and then resold into the secondary market 
through  the "securitization"  of mortgage  finance,  the profit  margins  on 
traditional  mortgage  tending  have been virtually  eliminated.  Indeed, the 
only way thrifts can profit  from holding long-term  mortgages  in their 
portfolios is to make interest rate bets-or  to behave in a way that 
exposes  them and their industry to insolvency when interest rates 
increase  significantly  over short  periods. 
The healthy  earnings  of the many  well-capitalized  thrifts  that  concen- 
trated heavily in mortgage lending in the 1980s, cited frequently as 
evidence that mortgage  lending continues to be profitable,  are highly 
misleading.  Thrifts  that  have made  interest  rate  bets since the early 1980s 
have, at least until recently, fared quite well. Between 1982  and 1988, 
short-term  interest rates dropped  far more substantially  (from the 10 
percent to the 6 percent range)  than did mortgage  interest rates (from 
the 12  percent  to the 10  percent  range). 
The relevant question  for policymakers  is whether  thrifts  can count 
on being  so fortunate  in the future.  Clearly,  the recent substantial  rise in 
short-term  interest rates suggests the answer is no. A Monte Carlo 
simulation  of expected profitability  of mortgage  investment  under  con- 
ditions prevailing  from 1982 to 1988, shown in figure 3, provides the 
same answer.3'  The figure  compares  the spread  of thrifts'  marginal  cost 
of funds (advances  from  the FHL Banks)  relative  to Treasury  securities 
with the corresponding  spreads  for both the current  (or "static yield") 
and "option-adjusted"  returns on newly issued Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation  (FHLMC) participation  certificates (PCs) for 
fixed-rate mortgages.32 
30. See Getman  (1989). 
31. The  following  analysis  draws  on Brumbaugh  and  Carron  (1988). 
32. Option-adjusted  spreads  indicate  the fair value of a mortgage  security  relative  to 
Treasury  securities-that is, the value of the mortgage  net of the embedded  options. The 
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Figure 3.  Simulation of Expected Profitability of Mortgage Investment,  1982-88 
Spread  to Treasury  (percent) 
3.0 
2.5  Net r-etained  ear-ninigs 
2.0- 
IA 
1.5  -  Marginal  //\  \f\ 
cost offunds  ,  -  I  ,  \ 
spread 
1.0  /  /-- 
0.5 
Mortgage  option-adjusted 
\  /  spr-ead 
0.0 _ 
-0.5  I  I  l  l  I  0 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Source:  First Boston  Corporation Fixed  Income  Research. 
The results tell a disturbing  story. Although  the current  spreads  for 
PCs throughout  the period  remained  above the spreads  for the marginal 
cost of funds, the option-adjusted  spread exceeded the marginal  cost 
spread  in only two of the seven years. Put another  way, through  most of 
1982-88,  thrifts  could not reasonably  anticipate  profitable  investment  in 
fixed-rate  mortgages. 
Large-scale  investment  in ARMs has occurred  too recently  to permit 
comparable  Treasury,  assuming  a number  of conditions  are met: that  the assumptions  on 
volatility,  prepayments,  and  investment  rates  are  realized.  If the comparison  is made  over 
a projected  holding  period,  rather  than  over the term  to maturity,  an additional  assumption 
is that  the mortgage  security  is priced  at the same  option-adjusted  spread  at the end of the 
holding  period.  The option-adjusted  methodology  aggregates  returns  from  many  different 
possible  future  scenarios,  although  only  one will actually  come to pass. As a consequence, 
the realized  return  is likely  to differ  from  the average  expected  return.  Results  will deviate 
further  to the extent that  the assumptions  about  volatility,  prepayments,  and  so forth  turn 
out to be inaccurate.  Any security  analyzed  will  be affected,  which  makes  option-adjusted 
spread  analysis  valuable  as a relative  value  indicator,  though  not as a yield spread  that  can 
be locked  in or guaranteed.  For a full description,  see Carron  and  Hogan  (1988). R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Andrew S.  Carron, and Robert E. Litan  283 
a similar  calculation  for ARMs. However, as this market  too is securi- 
tized, the spreads for ARMs will fall, just as they have for fixed-rate 
mortgages.  In short,  rolling  back the clock to the days before 1980  when 
thrifts  were forced  by law almost  exclusively into mortgage  investments 
is a sure way to consign what remains of the thrift  industry  to a slow 
death. That death could come much sooner if short-term  interest rates 
continue  to advance  sharply. 
In short, the clear message from the markets is that policymakers 
ought  to be searching  for ways to phase out the asset-based  distinctions 
between thrifts and banks rather  than reinforcing  them by raising the 
QTL. 
Conclusion 
The crisis among  the nation's thrifts  would cost at least $100 billion 
and as much as $150  billion  if it were resolved immediately.  The cost is 
likely to be even higher  since the resolution  of the problem  will surely 
be delayed. Moreover, the problems  among  thrifts  have obscured  from 
public view a taxpayer obligation  for failed banks that in other times 
would be highly unsettling. The weakness among many banks stems 
from  causes similar  to, but not identical  with, those that  led to the thrift 
crisis. 
Ultimately,  the best protection  for the insurance  agencies  and  taxpay- 
ers against future depository disasters is  sound capital regulation, 
implemented  through  more  realistic  accounting  methods  and  mandatory 
early  intervention"  by regulators. Comments 
and Discussion 
Benjamin  M. Friedman: R. Dan Brumbaugh,  J;1.,  Andrew  Carron,  and 
Robert  Litan  have analyzed,  carefully  and  in some detail, several  pieces 
of the U.S. thrift  industry  problem  that  has not  previously  been dissected 
in anything  like this transparent  a way. By doing so they have provided 
an extremely  useful service. 
First, their  paper  provides a detailed  analysis of the thrift  industry's 
balance sheet, not just at the aggregate  level but also in the form of 
distributions  broken  down in terms  of the number  of institutions  and  the 
amount of dollars in various categories of institutions according to 
capital-asset  ratio. Particularly  interesting  features of this part of the 
paper include the authors' adjustments  removing "good will" from 
institutions'  assets, and  their  careful  treatment  of the out-of-pocket  costs 
to the government  of resolving  these problems  (although,  as they point 
out, their estimates are understatements  in that they exclude the pro- 
spective revenue  loss to the Treasury  due to the tax benefits  given away 
last year in arranging  for purchases  of defunct  thrifts). 
A second useful service that the paper  provides is its careful  assess- 
ment  of the costs of the current  administration  proposal  for dealing  with 
this mess. These include  both the economic costs, which, as the authors 
show, depend crucially on differing economic assumptions, and the 
budgetary  costs, which depend,  in a peculiar  Alice-in-Wonderland  way, 
on the specific administrative  arrangements  to be employed. The paper 
also usefully summarizes  the other  principal  features  of the administra- 
tion proposal, including  higher  FDIC premiums,  stiffer  capital  require- 
ments, and so on. 
Finally, the paper provides a further useful service by focusing 
attention on the potential problem that now exists  in the nation's 
commercial  banking  industry.  I agree with the authors  that the banking 
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industry's  exposure in this regard  is a serious matter,  and I shall return 
to this issue shortly. 
I want to begin, however, by saying that, unlike the authors  of this 
paper,  as well as many  others who have written  or spoken  on this issue, 
I am skeptical of the view that the natural  thing to do is to put the 
government  borrowing  needed to resolve the thrift  problem  off-budget 
on the assumption that the actions to be  taken will have no real 
consequences. The argument  for putting this borrowing  off-budget  is 
that  all the government  will be doing, in bailing  out failed  institutions,  is 
making  good on promises  it had earlier  given. Specifically,  the govern- 
ment is converting contingent liabilities, liabilities that were already 
there and that everybody already recognized, into conventional debt 
obligations.  Hence no real economic effects will follow from this set of 
transactions-so the argument  goes-and  so these transactions,  includ- 
ing the borrowing  that  they entail, ought  to be entirely  off-budget. 
I find this argument  not persuasive, largely  because in this case it is 
so difficult  to specify the obvious alternative  to going ahead  and making 
good on the government's  promises. A number  of thrift  institutions  are 
now in such a state that they could not pay off their depositors  if all of 
them were to want their money back. The government is therefore 
proposing  to take over those institutions-or  to have them taken over 
by other, more  healthy  institutions-and in either  case to make  good on 
the depositors'  claims. 
What  is the alternative?  Is it simply  to let the insolvent  institutions  go 
on as they are? Is it to close  these institutions, but not have the 
government  make  good on their  depositors'  claims  against  them?  Is it to 
close these institutions and have the government make good on the 
insured  deposits, but to force all holders of uninsured  deposits to lose 
their  claims?  It is very difficult  to specify  just what  the logical  alternative 
is in a way that  provides  any confidence  that  going ahead  to convert the 
government's  liabilities  into conventional  debt instruments  will have no 
real economic effects. 
An analogy  may help to make  the point clear. The government  has a 
contingent  liability, through  the medicare  program,  to provide for the 
medical  care of the nation's  elderly citizens. Suppose that an unusually 
severe "flu season" next winter  caused the government  to incur  unex- 
pectedly  large  costs under  medicare.  Further  suppose  that, in parallel  to 
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Bush administration),  the government  were to set up a new off-balance 
budget entity called MEDICORP  to handle the extra costs of treating 
elderly flu patients. Few economists would accept the notion that this 
entity's financing  should be off-budget  on the grounds that providing 
this care was simply making good on a contingent liability that the 
government  had already assumed, and that replacing  this contingent 
liability with ordinary  debt instruments  would have no real economic 
effects. 
Whether  the activity to be undertaken  by the administration's  pro- 
posed REFCORP is or is not analogous to that of the hypothetical 
MEDICORP  depends  on what alternative  to going ahead  with the thrift 
industry  bailout  is specified. Against  what alternative  are there no real 
effects of this proposed  set of transactions?  But that  is just what no one 
has yet been able to specify in any convincing  way. 
Next, it is necessary  to raise  an  issue that  the  paper  does not mention- 
and, indeed, that is awkward  and uncomfortable  to discuss-but  that 
needs to be put into the public  discussion in some systematic  way. The 
standard  assumption  made in considering  the thrift  industry's current 
troubled  situation  is that what has gone wrong at problem  institutions 
has mostly been a matter  of their  loan portfolios. Various  explanations 
are then adduced  to explain why so many institutions'  portfolios have 
gone bad. 
For  example,  one standard  argument  relies  on purely  external  factors. 
The Texas oil boom turned  to an oil bust; as a result, those institutions 
with portfolios  consisting  largely  of loans collateralized  by Texas prop- 
erties were in trouble. The dollar  rose to levels at which U.S. farmers 
were unable to compete in world agricultural  markets; as a result, 
institutions  located in the Farm Belt, with assets consisting mostly of 
loans collateralized  by farm  properties,  also were in trouble. A second 
standard explanation for the proliferation  of bad loans is perverse 
incentives to the thrift  institutions  themselves, and on this subject the 
Brumbaugh-Carron-Litan  paper  is as clear  as any analysis  one can read. 
The combination  of limited liability and the ability to issue federally 
insured  deposits created a set of perverse incentives, which led many 
institutions  to take large  bets relative to their  capital. Not surprisingly, 
some of those bets turned  out favorably and others unfavorably.  Yet 
another  familiar  explanation,  for  at  least some  bad  loans, is the  occasional 
instance  of out-and-out  fraud. R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Andrew S.  Carron, and Robert E. Litan  287 
Without denying that bad loans, due to any or all of these three 
explanations,  constitute  the largest  single cause of the savings and loan 
industry's  current  difficulties,  I believe it is necessary also to take into 
account  the opportunities  and incentives that exist for owner-operators 
to milk these institutions  in ways that arise outside of their asset port- 
folios per se. One way of doing so, of course, is simply to set what the 
rest of the world regards  as absurdly  high compensation,  on a straight- 
wage basis, for owner-operators.  Apparently  that happens rarely. A 
more prevalent  activity is to use-indeed,  to abuse-a  whole range of 
executive perks, including  lavish travel, vacation condos, jet aircraft, 
and so forth. (One recently closed Texas institution  reportedly  had a 
fleet of five  jets.) Even more important,  incentive-based  compensation 
schemes, in a variety of forms usually  tied to such measures  as growth 
of assets, have become increasingly  commonplace.  These compensation 
incentives have, in turn,  interacted  with the more  familiar  incentives to 
"bet the bank" by taking  on questionable  loans financed  by federally 
insured  deposits. Under  many  compensation  schemes, therefore,  oper- 
ators not only face the perverse incentive of limited liability through 
their stock ownership  but also are allowed to compensate themselves 
more highly in circumstances  in which they acquire large amounts of 
what the rest of the world  would consider  to be questionable  assets. 
The relevant  issue is whether  all this bulks large enough in the thrift 
industry's current difficulties to warrant  beginning to include some 
treatment  of this kind  of activity-in  addition  to the usual focus on bad 
loans, of course-in  public discussion of the problem. Once again, an 
analogy may help. Virtually  everyone who deals with the developing 
world has always known that many forms of bribery and graft are 
commonplace  there. By contrast, most substantive  discussions of eco- 
nomic development  have typically assumed that the amount  of money 
involved  in these activities  is small  enough  to ignore  for macroeconomic 
purposes. But one of the things we have recently learned from the 
spreading  investigation  into the affairs  of the Philippines  is that, at least 
in the case of this one country, corruption  and outright  theft seem to 
have accounted  for between 25 percent and 50 percent  of the country's 
foreign indebtedness. At least in this case, therefore, to approach  the 
country's  problems  in  the  usual  way, thinking  only  about  macroeconomic 
models and the variables  that ordinarily  appear  in them, while ignoring 
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Is it not possible that using the usual economic models to look at the 
savings and loan industry's problem-focusing  on loan portfolio per- 
formance and incentives to make high-risk or low-risk loans, while 
assuming  that all institutions  are managed  in good faith-is  to miss half 
of this problem  as well? 
The next issue I want to address  is mentioned  in the authors'  paper, 
but I would like to have seen it given much more attention than it 
received. It arises  from  the fact that  the problems  that  the thrift  industry 
now faces have developed in the midst of what has now become seven 
years of uninterrupted  expansion  in the U.S. economy. To be sure, any 
business expansion  is bound  to be uneven. There  is always both a right- 
hand and a left-hand tail in the distribution  of outcomes realized by 
individual  businesses or individual  financial  institutions, even in this 
kind  of positive  overall  environment.  Although  the  authors  never  address 
this issue directly, any informed  reader of their paper will appreciate 
that the situation in this industry today is not simply a left-hand-tail 
problem. 
The fact that the thrift  industry's  problem  has arisen despite seven 
years of a strong  overall  economy is especially worrisome  in the context 
of the data  that  the authors  present  for the commercial  banking  system. 
Table  5 shows that  fully $1 trillion  worth  of bank  assets is held at banks 
with  less than  6 percent  capital-asset  ratios-in  some cases, far  less than 
6 percent-even  with all bank assets counted at book value. Table 6 
shows that roughly  $700  billion  out of that $1 trillion  is held at 13 of the 
nation's 15  biggest  banks. 
This situation  is worrisome  primarily  in light of the argument,  made 
in recent years by a number  of economists, to the effect that the U.S. 
economy's financial structure is  now extraordinarily  sensitive to a 
downturn  in business activity. Both Henry Kaufman  and I, relying on 
aggregate  data, have argued that the typical nonfinancial  firm in the 
United States has become sufficiently  indebted-not just in a balance- 
sheet sense but, more important,  in a cash flow sense-that  a severe 
downturn  in its earnings  would render  it unable  to service its liabilities. 
More  recently, Ben Bernanke  and  John Campbell,  relying  on firm-level 
data, have argued  that the same is true for an increasing  share of the 
distribution  of nonfinancial  firms.  To the  extent  that  Kaufman,  Bernanke, 
Campbell,  and I are right, it is necessary to ask what would become of 
the lenders who have advanced the funds that make up the debts that R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Andrew S.  Carron, and Robert E. Litan  289 
these firms would not be able to service, if a downturn in business 
activity  were to occur under  these circumstances. 
If a significant  downturn  in real  economic  activity  were to throw  many 
nonfinancial  firms  into default,  thereby  making  their  debts into what the 
banks would have to classify as nonperforming  assets, the problem 
highlighted  in the authors'  tables  5 and  6 would  be sharply  compounded. 
The macroeconomic  policy issues following from this pcssibility are 
profound.  The  most  immediate  issue is whether,  in  light  of this  heightened 
financial  fragility  and its potential consequences, the Federal Reserve 
System would be prepared  to tolerate any serious economic downturn 
that  could have such an impact  not  just on the nonfinancial  economy but 
on the banking  system as well. And if not, then  what  does that  unwilling- 
ness imply  for the Federal  Reserve's ability  to keep price  inflation  under 
control?  The authors'  paper  usefully  bears  on this important  set of issues 
by showing that the potential  weakness today in the U.S. commercial 
banking  sector is, if anything,  worse than  most people have realized. 
I will conclude my comments by turning to what I thought was 
potentially  the most interesting  part  of the paper  but, in the end, was its 
least satisfying part. It is, of course, what to do to prevent the thrift 
industry's  problem  from  continuing-not to ensure  that such a problem 
could never arise again, at some time in the future (which would 
presumably  be impossible),  but  at least to be sure  that  what  is happening 
now will stop. It is useful to think of the question in just these terms, 
because  part  of the  burden  of the  paper  is to show that  the  thrift  industry's 
problem  is not  just an historical  event that  is now over. As of April 1989, 
it is still  ongoing.  The question  of immediate  relevance, therefore,  is not 
what to do to prevent this situation  from happening  again, but what to 
do to prevent  it from simply  continuing  on. 
To be sure, the paper does offer some suggestions. These include 
stiffer  capital  requirements,  market  value accounting,  earlier  action on 
problem  institutions, risk-based  insurance  premiums,  and so on. The 
paper's most controversial claim in this regard is the argument  that 
tougher  capital standards  are capable of solving the problem more or 
less on their own. This argument  rests on two legs. The first is the 
analytical  argument  that having more capital in the business will give 
shareholders-and, therefore,  presumably  managements  acting  in their 
behalf-a  changed set of  incentives; in particular, limited liability, 
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longer  create  the perverse  incentives  now in  place. Second, the empirical 
basis for this claim is the finding  by previous researchers  that, in the 
past, banks' capital  levels have been a very good predictor  of failures 
either  one or two years in the future. 
While both the analytical  and the empirical  aspect of this argument 
are hardly irrelevant, I remain skeptical that higher capital require- 
ments-at  least within the foreseeable range (say, 6 percent)-would 
actually  be as effective in this regard  as the authors  suggest. After all, 
there  is capital,  and  then  again  there  is capital.  Even what  is Tier  I capital 
(basically,  equity)  to a bank  is often debt at the level of the bank  holding 
company. (If a bank is deficient in its Tier I capital, therefore, it can 
satisfy the requirement  by having its parent holding company issue a 
debt instrument  and put the proceeds downstream into the bank as 
equity.) While I fully support  Brumbaugh,  Carron,  and Litan's call for 
higher  capital  requirements,  for this and similar  reasons I think solving 
the problem of the nation's financial  institutions-even  in the limited 
sense of ensuring  that the current  situation  will not continue  further- 
will require  a broader  set of correctives. 
General  Discussion 
A number  of panelists elaborated  on the importance  of the adverse 
incentives (moral hazard) created by deposit insurance and possible 
ways of dealing with them. Robert Hall noted that the moral hazard 
problem  created  by deposit insurance  is analogous  to the moral  hazard 
present for any debt-financed  corporation.  Stockholders  and manage- 
ment may actually have a preference  for risk, as negative returns  are 
disproportionately  at the expense of the insurer-the U.S. taxpayers  or 
bond holders-whereas  positive returns  benefit stockholders. He also 
noted two reasons why the moral  hazard  problem  may be more severe 
for thrifts and banks than for other debt-financed  corporations.  First, 
for reasons not adequately  explained, banks and thrifts are relatively 
lightly  capitalized,  so stockholders  are very highly  levered. As a result, 
the divergence between the stockholder's and creditor's interests is 
greater  than for most corporations.  Second, private lenders, banks or 
bond  holders,  insist on carefully  written  covenants  to ensure  that  capital 
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requirements  are not met. In the case of banks and thrifts, taxpayers 
serve the role of the bond holders, but the government  has not, on their 
behalf, insisted  on the covenants that  would  protect  their  interests. 
Many  participants  reasoned  that  capital  requirements  serve the same 
role as bond covenants, but agreed  with the general  view that they are 
currently  inadequate.  Whenever  bankruptcy  probabilities  rise, as they 
have for a great many thrifts, the moral hazard problem becomes 
significant. James Duesenberry noted that not only do legal capital 
requirements  need  to be adequate,  but  there  also needs  to be a mechanism 
for catching  any deterioration  in capital  position  before  it is too late. He 
suggested creating a debenture component to the banks' capital that 
would  be rolled  over each year.  This  would  encourage  those debt  holders 
to review the banks' activities more actively. William  Poole liked the 
idea of subordinated  notes but suggested  that the notes requirement  be 
specified  as a percentage  of insured  deposits rather  than  of assets since 
assets are imperfectly  measured  whereas  deposits are not. 
Joseph  Stiglitz  observed  that  because deposit insurance  removes any 
element of risk from the decision of individuals  about where to place 
their  funds, the market  for deposits is highly  price competitive. There- 
fore, even without  moral  hazard  considerations,  banks concerned  with 
their  cash flow must reach  for high-yield,  but risky, loans when deposit 
rates are high. Stiglitz thought  that abolishing  deposit insurance, thus 
forcing  a greater  sensitivity  of depositories  to risk, would  naturally  lead 
the institutions  to settle on higher  capital  ratios  than  they now have. 
Michael  Wachter  observed that a major  difficulty  in a bankruptcy  is 
determining  the portion of the payments to which each asset holder is 
entitled, and that this difficulty  may actually  be greater  for banks than 
for  thrifts.  Commercial  banks  have  a more  complicated  liability  structure 
than  thrifts,  so that  the  ambiguities  of priority  in  claims  may  lead  creditors 
to demand  liquidations  at an earlier  stage of financial  trouble  than they 
would with a typical  corporation. 
James Tobin did not believe that the proposed increases in required 
capital could solve the basic problem  of moral hazard  associated with 
deposit insurance.  He thought  deposit insurance  was obsolescent. He 
noted that the original  motivation  for deposit insurance  was to prevent 
recurrence  of the panic of 1932-33. This was a run from bank deposits 
to currency, destroying bank reserves that the Federal Reserve was 
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likely to be a shift of deposits from one financial  institution  to another, 
and that anyway any run to currency  would be met by an expansion  of 
reserves by  the Federal Reserve. Therefore, much of  the original 
motivation  for deposit  insurance  no longer  exists. He also noted  that  the 
moral  hazard  inherent  in deposit insurance  has been accentuated  by the 
decline of surveillance, the deregulation  of deposit interest rates, the 
new  ideology  of unbridled  tough  competition,  and  the  loss of the  fiduciary 
ethic that  bankers  used to have. 
Tobin also observed that deposit insurance covers not only the 
principal  of a deposit  but  also accrued  interest,  and  that  de  facto  insurance 
had been extended to cover all deposits and not  just the $100,000  that  is 
the law. He advocated a reform  to confine insurance  to those deposits 
backed  by safe assets of short  maturity.  These deposits could serve as a 
convenient interest-bearing  substitute for currency. The only role of 
deposit  insurance  would be to protect  depositors  against  dishonesty  and 
fraud. Other deposits could be invested in riskier assets and loans, 
subject  to normal  supervision.  So long as depositors  are made  aware  of 
the risks of such deposits, Tobin believed they need not be insured  by 
the taxpayers. 
Hall went further, suggesting that there was no longer a need for 
thrifts. In his view, their original purpose, to intermediate  between 
mortgage  borrowers  and depositors, has been met more satisfactorily 
through  securities  markets.  In  fact, thrifts  are  being  replaced  very rapidly 
by uninsured  institutions,  such as mutual  funds, that do not have to pay 
deposit insurance  rates. Lawrence White disagreed  with Hall, arguing 
that there is still a niche in the market  for a provider  with specialized 
knowledge of  local mortgage markets and that many thrifts serve 
effectively and efficiently in that role. Tobin noted that the structural 
problems with thrifts apply to banks as well; getting rid of the thrift 
industry  would not solve the problems of the financial  intermediation 
industry.  Duesenberry  agreed with Tobin and went on to caution that 
the transformation  of thrifts  into banks should be gradual  so that they 
acquire  experience  in making  commercial  loans  before  becoming  heavily 
dependent  on them. 
Hall also argued  that liquidations  of thrifts are better than mergers 
because  with  liquidation,  but  not with  mergers,  the option  cost of deposit 
insurance  to the government  is canceled. White  responded  that liquida- 
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the deposits in the liquidated  institutions  are likely to end up in another 
depository  institution. 
White  observed that insurance  company  practices suggest a variety 
of mechanisms  to deal with the adverse incentives created by deposit 
insurance.  Capital  requirements  imposed  by the FDIC serve effectively 
as a deductible  on ordinary  insurance.  Regulators  can insist on the use 
of market  value accounting. They can charge premiums  based on the 
risk involved, including the levels of capital maintained. They can 
practice  coinsurance  by insuring  deposits  up  to a  limited  amount.  Finally, 
they should have regulations  that allow them to intervene early and 
thereby  effectively to cancel the insurance  coverage. 294  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
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